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**Decentralization Policy
in Zimbabwe: Impact on
Local Government Performance**

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**DECENTRALISATION POLICY IN ZIMBABWE
IMPACT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE**

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TABLE OF CONTENT

1.0.	INTRODUCTION	1
2.0.	DECENTRALISATION: BEHIND THE FACADE	2
3.0.	DECENTRALISATION IN ZIMBABWE: FROM 1980-1993	5
3.1.	Stage One: 1980-1985	5
3.2.	State Two: 1985-1993	6
3.3.	State Three: 1993 (July)....	7
4.0.	LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE - A COMPARATIVE APPRAISAL	8
4.1.	Resource Mobilisation	8
4.2.	Service Provision	10
5.0.	DETERMINANT VARIABLES: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS	14
5.1.	Direct Variables	15
5.2.	Indirect Variables	20
6.0.	IMPACT OF DECENTRALISATION ON THE PERFORMANCE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES	27
6.1.	Local Authorities' Finances and the Role of the State	27
6.2.	Services Provisions	30
6.3.	Difference in Performance Across Council	31
7.0.	CONCLUSION	32
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	34
	DOCUMENTS	35
	CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE STUDY AREAS	36
	Kadoma Town Council	36
	Gokwe District Council	36
	Harava District Council	37
	Harare City Council	38
	APPENDIX	39
	PROJECT DONE - COST AND IMPLEMENTING AGENCY	63

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Our territory's local government systems have evolved since time immemorial, keeping pace with the challenges of the development of human settlements. In these immemorial battles to determine the organic measurement of time and space in the development of human settlement, the nature of the centre-local community relations has been the subject of many academic studies (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983; 1985; Griffin, 1985; Leela, 1975; Uphoff and Esman, 1984; White, 1986; Wekwete, 1987; 1992; Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1992).

Decentralisation is the most common concept used in Zimbabwe to describe the relations between the centre and the local communities. Whether this is the most appropriate mode to capture these intricate relations is not the issue. Rather, it is the exposition of the concrete objectives behind the evolution of centre-local relations from 1980 in Zimbabwe, incorporating both the macro and micro actors and their interaction, that is the problem.

Prior to 1980 three forms of local government prevailed. These are Urban Councils (established under the Urban Councils Act of 1891), District Councils (African Councils Act 1937) and Rural Councils (Rural Councils Act 1966). Urban and Rural Councils reflected the interests of the European settlers and landowners who were also a key lobby in terms of national politics (Wekwete 1988). The two enjoyed a higher degree of delegated authority in the undertaking and provision of services. African Councils (District Councils) however, were linked to traditional authority of chiefs and sub chiefs and observations are that this system did not reflect the interests of the locals, but was rather meant to control native development in the interests of the European economy (Arrighi, 1967; Clarke, 1978; and Wekwete, 1988). Democratic representation, for Europeans only, was practised in Urban and Rural Councils. In African Councils central government was strongly represented by the District Commissioner.

The state of Zimbabwe demonstrated its commitment to the concept of decentralisation in 1980. To allow local participation in development and decision-making, a reorganisation exercise of the pre-independence local government system in rural and urban areas was carried out. Pre-independence Legal Instruments (African Councils Act, Urban Councils Act, Rural Councils Act) were amended and a new Act (Rural District Councils Act 1988) was enacted, in an attempt to reflect the new government's thrust (for more detail see section 3.0).

This study therefore seeks to broach those issues which though implicit in the debates (Helmsing, Gasper, Wekwete, Mutizwa-Mangiza etc.) have not received full exposure. These issues include the conceptualisation of decentralisation and the motive force behind it and the stages it has gone through since 1980. Of particular concern is the gap between legislative acts and the situation on the ground. One question will therefore suffice: What is the impact of decentralisation as is practised in Zimbabwe on the performance of the local authorities? Three key features come to mind. First, performance will be measured in terms of outcome rather than in terms of input which is often done. Second, the approach includes a number of factors which are external to local governments but nevertheless are assumed to affect their performance significantly. Third, the study will assume an interdisciplinary approach (Therkildson &

Semboja, 1989).

This article is divided into five sections. A brief review of the concept of decentralisation will be made in the first section. The second section discusses the general characteristics of the first two stages of decentralisation. This will be followed in section three and four by an assessment of the Performance Indicators and the impact of decentralisation on these indicators respectively. The last section will be the conclusion to the paper.

2.0 DECENTRALISATION: BEHIND THE FACADE

Centralisation, fashionable as it was during and immediately after World War II, had as its main objective, the promotion of the modernisation theory, in which international agencies had invested their hope for a quick economic, social and political recovery. Faith was placed in the "trickle down" and a "spread out effect" of benefits from concentrated industrial development in urban areas to alleviate poverty and generate income and savings down the line. The failure of the "trickle down" and "spread-out effect" became apparent in the early 1970s. Cracks began to show signalling the imminent shift in development theory. Theories which advocated for the involvement of the intended beneficiaries gained prominence and the policy shift to growth with equity gained popularity. Regional development corporations to stimulate local investment and greater agricultural production were established. Consequently, Provincial, District and Regional Planning Committees were set up to provide administrative structures and coordinate local initiatives.

Decentralisation was in the making. But did these new developments imply negation of the centre? The quickest and more fitting answer one can get is a big No. One would be tempted to argue that there should therefore be an umbilical link between the centre and the local levels to ensure that the whole does not fall into disorder. Nonetheless, the essence of the process of decentralisation is better captured by the forms that it takes. Deconcentration, Devolution, Delegation and Privatisation are the forms that come to mind (for detail see Rondinelli and Cheema, 1985; Gasper, 1991; Conyer, 1984; Nellis, 1986; Hyden, 1983). Common in these four forms of decentralisation is their thrust on the reallocation of power (economic, political and social) from the centre to the local levels. Differences, though, exist on the operational side: how much of the power is allocated at a given time, by what means and to whom? These questions touch on what Conyer (1986) and Smith (1979) referred to as the "many dimensions" of decentralisation [see Conyer (1986) for the five dimensions].

These dimensions presuppose that there is a multiplicity of processes generated in the course of reallocation of power from the centre to lower levels. Indeed processes cannot be without the respective actors that generate them. Subsequently, the idea that in such a relationship some groups gain relative to others is likely to involve disagreements. Accordingly the view that decentralisation and indeed the forms it takes in practice, come about as a result of the coalition of groups who support it outweighing-cum-out-manoeuvring the groups that oppose it (Smith, 1980) puts the debate on a new plane: that of the relation between state and civil society. The notion of a state as exclusively an institutional category, with its own coherence, logic and capability whose interest is viewed as solemnly the interest of its managers is taken to

task. Concurring with Smith and also dismissing the above notion, Mamdani(1992) argues that "contradictions within civil society are reproduced within the state".

A question arises at this stage of the debate: who initiates decentralisation policies? Two suggestive views could be unveiled here. If the initiative is from the centre, Smith's contribution raises the first suggestion that there are contradictions within the state itself. If down-top initiatives, to which Mamdani refers as sharp struggles from below, influence the pace and form of decentralisation, then it would only be proper to suggest that these contradictions would be located within the lower tiers of the governmental system (Province and Districts)and the different civil society institutions within them. The unifying link between these two broad processes would be that the latter is not just external to the state but rather various and even contradictory groups in civil society differently penetrate the state(Mamdani, 1992).

As is currently the case, the centre initiates the policies in developing countries suggesting also that the level of decentralisation is a reflection of the interaction of interest groups within the state itself. The balance of power between these groups and the level of influence from below would as a rule determine the preparedness and willingness of government to identify the appropriate functions that it can and should decentralise, to whom and at what stage(Rondinelli and Cheema, 1985).

Decentralisation is therefore not a singular process of change but is often a partial response to a multiple of internally and externally induced processes (Therkildson, Semboja, 1989). Gore (1984) opened a pandora box when he argued that regional policies are used to serve purposes such as assisting private capital accumulation or for legitimating and extending government authority. It is often argued that for the latter purpose to materialise a combination of central control and local autonomy is a necessary condition. If the logic of the above is that the centre has to cede some power in order to retain more, the new power centres that are created must have some independent scope, in order to be willing to largely serve the centre's objectives. This compliments Smith's assertion that decentralisation should be seen as part of the process by which dominant classes, including those at the local level, articulate their interests. In other words the state reinforces certain interests in civil society and undermine others (Mamdani, 1992).

The centre-local authority controversy raised by Griffin (1981) and Mashanda-Shopo (1987) fall within this debate. In advocating for decentralisation, Griffin warned that power at the local level can be more concentrated, more elitist and applied more ruthlessly against the poor than at the centre. Mashanda-Shopo alluded to the dangers of allowing national development objectives to be divided into local and national issues noting that such dualism, where local issues are non-political, can only divert the national effort to development into an uncoordinated series of petty and regional chauvinistic projects for municipal socialism. This, it seems, is a warning against unbridled devolution of power as the interest groups in the new power centres would determine their own destiny, some of which could be outside national policies. Gramsci(1971) might have, in his own way, summarised the above discussion in his attempt to explain the concept of governance:

The ideas of the Free Trade movement are based on a theoretical error whose practical origin is not hard to identify. They are based on a distinction between political society and civil society, which is made into and presented as an organic one, whereas in fact it is merely methodological. Thus it is asserted that economic activity belongs to civil society, and that the State must not intervene to regulate it. But since in actual reality civil society and State are one and the same, it must be made clear that "laissez-faire" too is a form of state "regulation" introduced and maintained by legislative and coercive means. It is a deliberate policy conscious of its own ends and not the spontaneous, automatic expression of economic facts. Consequently, "laissez-faire" liberalism is a political programme, designed to change - in so far as it is victorious - a State's leading personnel and to change the economic programme of the State itself - in other words the distribution of the national income.

Griffin (1981) emphasises that the nature of the relationship between different participants in decentralisation depends on the circumstances under which decentralisation occurs. Local authorities provide the geographical and spatial context within which national development takes place. They therefore provide the territorial framework within which many actors involved in development interact. These include Central Government, Local Governments, Parastatals, Private Companies, NGOs, Community Organisations etc. The success of decentralisation policies indeed depends on the environment in which interaction among these organisations takes place. The combination of purpose between territorial and functional (Gasper, 1991) decentralisation becomes more important. This is so because the capacity of Local Government to carry out programmes and projects effectively and through reciprocal relationships with other organisations may be more significant than their legal status as independent units. (Rondinelli, 1985). Esman and Uphoff's (in Rondinelli 1985) argued that the ability of local authorities to provide services and generate development is a function of the linkages that local governments have with other organisations. This seems to strengthen the point that local authorities provide the space in which the interests of different actors interact and cross fertilize each other. The picture of a harmonious and non-contradictory civil society is relegated to romantics (Mamdani 1992). The context presented above depicts a contradictory combination with constant conflict between classes and groups each trying to impose its hegemony over the others.

To capture these struggles in a more synthesised way, Gasper (1991) alluded to the three attitudes observed in Indian literature. First, he noted that the orthodox mainstream defends decentralisation and centrally devised programmes for needy "target groups". Second, an orthodox opposition defends devolution and attacks the dominance of national elites in present policies. Third, one type of radical opposition accepts both critiques, but supports devolution as hopefully providing the incentives and opportunity for poor majorities to eventually mobilise.

These are preferences of different groups and this can also be reflective of the different groups within the state. But the question is how do these trends relate to the conclusion (Rondinelli, 1985) that only in those countries where decentralisation was defined more narrowly and the scope of policies was limited to reallocating functions among units of central government did developing countries achieve their intended goals. How far does this conclusion, as opposed to the above preference, accept the notion that decentralisation is a family means of various ends? Practice indicates that regardless of the preferences of different groups, forms of decentralisation are not independent of each other, but they run through one another, run side by side, cross one another, flow in and over one another and it is a ceaselessly moving changing sea of phenomena. In

other words, it could be argued that small-scale incremental transfers of power and responsibilities to local government does not negate the other forms of decentralisation but strengthen them (Helmsing, 1991).

On the above note the section that follows will attempt to show, in a more descriptive fashion, whether the post-independence state has really desired a decentralised system or they have created an even more centralised system of governance in the process.

3.0 DECENTRALISATION IN ZIMBABWE: FROM 1980 TO 1993

The central objectives of the post independence government can be articulated in point form as follows:

- 1) To redress the imbalances in economic development, which were enshrined in the local government system.
- 2) Democratisation of the whole local government system.
- 3) Strengthening public participation in development.

As mentioned earlier on, three stages of decentralisation can be identified over the past 13 years. The first two, which have been completed, stretched from 1980 to 1993. The ten months old third stage in the evolution of decentralisation is yet to be explained.

3.1 Stage One: 1980-1984

Stage one (1980 to 1984) was characterised by the overhauling of the colonial local government system. About 220 former African councils were replaced by 55 district councils. The African Councils Act was superseded by the District Councils Act(1980) which placed a lot of emphasis on democratic representation in the newly constituted councils. The role of traditional authority fizzled out in the process, and so did the role of District Commissioner.

The newly constructed district councils did not have the capacity, both technical and financial, to provide the necessary infrastructure in the form of roads, bridges, boreholes, wells, schools, health centres etc. The District Development Fund(DDF) which is a quasi-governmental organisation acted as the major construction unit in the areas that fall under district councils' jurisdiction. One of the major characteristics of this stage is that district councils did not have independent sources of revenue as the pre-independence sources (taxes) were discontinued in 1980. These were considered to be politically sensitive. As a rule, all the administrative expenses of council were met by the government. Government and non governmental organisations(NGOs) were the developmental agencies in these areas implying that functions were allocated among government units.

In urban areas the Urban Councils Act of 1973 was amended to reflect the new non-racial order. However, no major changes were introduced in the operations and/or functions of the urban councils. Their powers and responsibilities to provide services and raise revenue was not tempered with by the new Act.

To compliment their effort Government chipped in with educational and health per capita grants. Rates (property tax) which are levied by councils on residents and business ventures remained their major source of income.

Rural councils continued intact. Compared to district councils these are largely self-sufficient and self-financing (Wekwete, 1988). Their main source of income is the unit tax charged on units of land and like in urban areas, from rating of land and improvements thereof. Loans and grants are also provided by central government.

A two-pronged system of local government in rural areas persisted over this period with the district councils co-existing with the rural councils. District councils represented the predominantly peasant farmers (small-holder farmers) and the rural councils represented the large scale commercial farmers.

3.2 Stage Two: 1985-1993

The then Prime Minister's Directive of 1984 ushered in a new stage both territorially and functionally to the process of decentralisation. Local government was strengthened through the formalisation of the hierarchical link-pin system (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1986). Village and ward structures were formed within district and urban councils (although their legality is questionable in urban areas). These were expected to perform the following functions:

The Village Development Committee (VIDCO):

- a) identify and articulate village needs;
- b) co-ordinate and forward village needs to Ward Development Committees (WADCOs);
- c) link between WADCOs and the people;
- d) co-ordinate and co-operate with government extension workers at village level;
- e) organise village work-force to undertake major village work programmes.

The Ward Development Committee (WARDCO):

- a) provide a central planning authority linking six villages
- b) be an overseer that co-ordinates development plans of the six villages i.e. re-examining and prioritising projects and programmes that come from the villages.

The system provided decentralised structures of decision making at local authority levels to ensure that forums exist to facilitate coordination of local level decisions with central government ministries and agencies. The District Development Committee provides such a forum at the district level. Two new dimensions were introduced to district councils. Development levy as a source of income for district councils was legally

introduced to increase their revenue base. The District Administrator's (DA) post was reintroduced (recruitment began in 1982) albeit without some of the functions performed by their predecessors (District Commissioners), for example, issuing of birth and death certificates, identity cards, salaries for teachers etc. The DA is central government's senior representative at the district level. District councils remained dependent on Central Government for salaries of their senior staff and allowances for councillors. Functions that are allocated to governments units were in this stage complemented by the district council's own projects (both developmental and income generating projects), but the former remained the main agency for development. The dual structure of local government system in rural areas remained.

In urban areas the involvement of the Vidcos and the Wardcos in decision-making is minimal if they exist at all. Although the two lower institutions do exist at least on paper, the equivalent of DDC in urban and rural council areas is not known. As was the case in the first stage, urban local authorities meet all their expenses and have greater flexibility in the sourcing of funds. However, grants have been on a continually sliding trend. This is true for the three council systems.

The three local government systems are coordinated at a provincial level. The major role of the provincial committee seems to be that of reporting to the centre through the Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development on the progress and problems of the lower levels of government. The office of the Governor was also created at this level. He/she chairs the meetings of the provincial councils. But because this provincial forum of the PDC lacks the necessary capacity to implement plans and authority to make affirmative decisions, lower levels of local authorities have continued to look to central government who directly provide them with funds and expertise.

3.3 Stage Three : 1993(July)

Rural district council is the name of the councils brought about by the amalgamation of the former rural and district councils and they are governed by the Rural District Council Act of 1988. Besides the name, all the other structures remain the same as those that were operational in the two former local authorities. The DA has been sacrificed in favour of an employee of council as the Chief Executive of the new councils. Nonetheless the DA will act during the transitional one-year period as Chief Executives of the amalgamation. The nature of the relationship between the centre and the local authorities is not clear as DAs are literally disappearing from the scene. But from the look of it all, rural district councils are evolving towards the type of autonomy that urban councils or the former rural councils enjoyed in both the first and second stages of decentralisation. There is not, however, anything new to cheer about for the urban councils in this third stage. But for the rural district councils the long journey into the unknown has just begun.

The centre is ceding some power through small-scale incremental transfers of authority and responsibilities to local government. This process is reciprocated by an apparent withdrawal of the centre from local level affairs. The impact of this strategy on the performance of local authorities will be looked into in the following sections.

4.0 LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE: A COMPARATIVE APPRAISAL

Four local authorities were selected as case study areas in an attempt to assess the impact of decentralisation policy on the performance of councils. Of the four, two are in the rural areas (Gokwe and Harava District Councils) and the other two are in urban areas (Harare and Kadoma Urban Councils). Although the selection of the four was deliberate, the target councils had to either fall in two broad categories of: (i) good performers (Harare City Council and Gokwe District Council) and (ii) bad performers (Kadoma Town Council and Harava District Council).

Field visits to these council areas were made and extensive interviews with administrators, councillors, business people, community leaders, line ministries officials and central government officers were carried out. On the basis of the information compiled in the field and secondary data gathered during the study, this section presents a comparative assessment of the performance of the selected local authorities. An evaluation will also be made on what areas local authorities have managed on their own and those on which central government, parastatals, private companies and NGOs were involved directly in an attempt to highlight the level of interaction of the forms of decentralisation in Zimbabwe and indeed the relevance of the government strategy (as outlined above) on decentralisation.

Three criteria have been used to measure the performance of Local Governments studied. These are:

- (i) Resource mobilisation
- (ii) Service provision
- (iii) Equity in service provision

Of the three criteria above the first two will be covered extensively. Attention on the third criteria was concentrated on ratios or simple proportions and is implicit in the sections that follow. The cost and benefit of the services to households as a measure of equity is beyond the scope of this study.

4.1 Resource Mobilisation

Resources constitute the life-line of both the urban and district local authorities. The amount of resources at the disposal of the respective authorities indicates their potential to run their own affairs and therefore the level to which they depend on central government. However, the amount of disposable resources also depends on the ability of the local authorities to tap the resources available within their localities and/or those sources stipulated in the Acts that govern them.

The above apply to both urban and district councils. Urban councils are divided into cities and towns, with the former having an added advantage as, besides other sources of revenue, they can raise money on the open money market (Harare and Bulawayo). District councils have different sources to those of urban councils. The revenue sources for the district councils only differ from one district to another where one District has more natural resources than the other. This notwithstanding, local authorities also have different "in built" abilities and capacity to raise funds from the same sources. The development levy is one example of the above. The potential of development levies as a source of revenue compared to the actual amounts collected in each of the districts surveyed illustrate the differing abilities of these districts. Gokwe and Harava's average annual potentials are calculated at Z\$340 060 and Z\$82 045 respectively. Between 1988 and 1992 Gokwe therefore expected to raise Z\$1 360 240 and Harava Z\$328 180. But the actual figures for the four-year period only amounted to Z\$237 640.00 for Gokwe and Z\$33 333 (Z\$50 000 over six years) for Harava, representing 18 percent and 10 percent of their respective potentials. Drought, methods of collection used and the political sensitiveness of the levy (which resembles the colonial poll tax) were cited as the main reasons for the shortfall.

On another note district councils tend to have the capacity to mobilise resources from sources other than the development levy. Beer levies have proved to be a blessing in disguise for Harava while Gokwe's natural resources endowment is a gift from God. On beer levies which is common in the two districts, Harava has raised an average of not less than Z\$500 000 per annum with the 1992 estimates being revised upwards to Z\$624 984 from Z\$400 000 initial estimates. Gokwe on the other hand have on average collected less than Z\$50 000 per annum.

Income-generating projects also contribute substantially to local revenue. These accounted for 40 percent and 28 percent of locally generated revenue in Harava and Gokwe respectively during the 1991-92 financial year. In the 1992-93 financial year Harava's income from projects held steady at 40 percent of revenue while Gokwe's surged to 53 percent of locally generated revenue (there was an almost 50 percent drop in locally generated income in the 1992-93 financial year).

In a nutshell the single most productive source of income for the two districts are different. From the breakdown above Gokwe depend more on land lease, income-generating projects and timber royalties which account for 15%, 28% and 35% of the total internally generated revenue and Harava depends on beer levy and income from projects for slightly above 50% and 40% of the revenue income budget (at 1992/3 financial year). Development Levies which should constitute the backbone of the district council resources have not reached the one percent mark of the total budget for Harava and is slightly above 3.5 percent for Gokwe.

Kadoma's financial problems seem to be endemic. Only one of their accounts (beer account) showed surplus since the early 1980s. This account which made profits has now been upset by the same virus that affected the rate account and the housing account. Failure to repay central government loans since 1990 has meant that alternative sources have to be found to finance capital expenditure. To add on to the above, loan arrears and the backlog in the production of financial statements jeopardised any hopes the council had of qualifying for the World Bank sponsored Urban II project.

To instil financial discipline into the council operations a Financial Recovery Plan was

initiated in 1990. Their failure to meet targets set for recovery and worse still the postponement of the target deadlines shows how the main sources of revenue, which are the rate fund, water fund and housing fund have failed to support the proposed plan. The three together contribute an average of about 67% of total revenue.

Harare depends more on the rates account which contributes slightly over 50% of total revenue. The second which is the water accounts only account for less than 50% of what the rate account contribute to revenue. Unlike in Kadoma, in Harare there is an over-reliance on one source of revenue. This however, indicates that there are some high yielding sub-accounts within the rate account.

Of the four local authorities surveyed, only Kadoma is struggling to make ends meet, although it is the only one with evenly distributed sources of revenue. Kadoma's problem is mainly that its sources are highly vulnerable to factors like drought (water account); unemployment and an unexpanding industrial base (rate account) and (housing account). Harava is also vulnerable as its main source of revenue (beer levy) is subject to the continuance of the beer levy agreement. Suppose that the beer levy arrangement is discontinued, Harava, unlike Gokwe, will be severely disadvantaged. In other words Harava is more vulnerable to changes in central government's financing policy than Gokwe. The latter is rich in natural resources.

4.2 Service Provision

Local authorities are entrusted by their respective Acts to provide a wide range of services to the people under their jurisdiction. In the main, the services provided by district and urban councils do not differ. The following are some of the major services that councils are expected to provide:

- (1) Housing
- (2) Sewage
- (3) Roads
- (4) Water supply
- (5) Health services
- (6) Primary education
- (7) Cleaning of cities and towns and refuse collection
- (8) Community centres
- (9) Parks
- (10) Recreational facilities
- (11) Fire brigade
- (12) Ambulances
- (13) Creches and kindergartens etc.

This study will deal with the first seven services, because of their direct effect on the people's daily life, and also because data is relatively easily available.

4.2.1 Housing

One of the three basic needs of mankind is shelter (housing), and the local authorities are charged with the responsibility of providing this service to the people under their command. The idea is not only the provision of housing but affordable accommodation to different strata of the dwellers within the council's jurisdiction.

The demand for housing in urban and district councils is quantitatively different. In the majority of cases rural dwellers have little requirements of the servicing of stands except at growth points and on other business centres. However, in the urban areas servicing of stands is a requirement and this adds substantially to the cost of providing accommodation. Housing has proved to be the most difficult service to provide in urban areas partly because of the above. The swelling waiting list is testimony to the above. To demonstrate the dimension of the problem of housing, waiting list figures have been used. The waiting list for Gokwe centre stands at 6 000 people and Harare and Kadoma have their waiting lists growing at an average per annum of 10 343 and 2 589 people per annum respectively. This compares negatively to the annual housing output of 2 849 housing units for Harare. Kadoma is virtually at a stand-still as they failed to qualify for the World Bank Urban II Scheme. Loans are proving difficult to come by due to unbalanced financial books.

On the other hand, the waiting list continues to grow. The average per household of seven people (based on 1988 statistics) shows the level of overcrowding in this town of 67 267 people. Financial difficulties proved to be the major constraint for Kadoma. Harare is confronted with an alarming influx of people from different directions. The population of Harare is growing at an annual average of 13 percent since 1982. This is a 10.1 percentage point over the national average population growth rate of 3.9 percent. Gokwe's problem however, is that of shortage of surveyors.

Withdrawal by the centre from providing housing between 1985 and 1992 against the background of increasing demand reduced the efforts by urban councils to a "drop in the ocean". However, the intervention by government through the Ministry of Public Constructuion and National Housing (1992 Cluster Housing Project) albeit too late too little, has come as a relief to both rural and urban councils, particularly so to councils like Kadoma which cannot raise enough financial resources for capital development.

4.2.2 Education

This service is divided into primary and secondary education. Local authorities are responsible only for the provision of primary education as secondary education remains the responsibility of the sector ministry. However, it is important to point out that local authorities are only charged with the provision of the infrastructure (classrooms, furniture etc). The sector Ministry through per capita grants, provides the books and other required learning materials. Teachers as civil servants are on the payroll of the ministry. Only one aspect of education therefore comes up for assessment. How have councils fared in providing the infrastructure?

Starting with the district councils it is only but fair to say that Gokwe is a relatively new district (see context section) compared to Harava. The demand for such infrastructure was/and as a rule is still high in Gokwe than in Harava. The post- independence Harava has yet to put up any new infrastructure for primary education as those inherited from the pre-independence era (14 primary schools) still meet demand. Gokwe however, had no proper schools before independence. There was a phenomenal growth in council schools in Gokwe from 1980. The district now has 225 schools, of which 199 are primary schools. About half of these are donor-funded. While the above indicate the capacity of council to provide this particular service, the preponderance of donor assistance also indicates the level of demand for service which council could not have met had donor assistance not been availed to the district.

Harare City Council has in total 27 council schools built as from 1985. Those built prior to this date are all government schools. The average number of classrooms per school is 28. With a total of approximately 266 186 children of primary school (5-14 years) going age, Harare cannot do without hot sitting (two sessions per each grade per day). Kadoma, like Harare, experiences this same problem. There are 14 primary schools in Kadoma leaving a deficit of 11 primary schools. For the construction of new schools the council charges its residences \$2.00 which is collected through water charges. However, these resources are not adequate. All schools in Harare and Kadoma have two sessions per each grade (hot sitting). Harare City Council has admitted that they can no longer meet the demand for "dollar for dollar" scheme in the construction of schools. Hence the mounting pressure from both councillors and executives to abolish the scheme. The council is now being forced into an embarrassing situation of failing to meet their side of the contract.

The above notwithstanding, it is in the running and actual delivery of educational service that councils find themselves "crowded out" by the centre. Whereas respective councils Acts empower them to run schools, the Ministry of Education and Culture has and is still building parallel structures at the local level alienating councils in the process. To show discontent, Harava district council has unilaterally decided to stop receiving education grants from the Ministry leaving the latter to run the show.

4.2.3 Health

The spaced nature of settlement in rural areas makes the provision of services like health, water etc more than difficult and costly to provide. Gokwe has in total four hospitals (one district and three mission hospitals), and 26 clinics. Thirteen of these were built after 1984. Harava on the other hand, boasts of one rural hospital and 4 clinics, all built before 1980.

Harare has in total 32 council clinics and two hospitals (council owned), while Kadoma have six council clinics and one government hospital. It was clearly indicated during the survey that demand for health is very high and councils cannot meet it. Assuming that a standard 1 000 houses per clinic is taken as a measure, it would mean that Harare alone would need 76 clinics, Kadoma nine clinics, Gokwe 37 and Harava five as compared to the current 32; five; 26 and four respectively. However, if the number of people per house is considered the above figures would definitely be revised upwards.

As is the case in education, local authorities provide the infrastructure and the needed equipment. Essential drugs and salaries for the health staff are settled from government

grants through the Ministry of Health. Nonetheless, central government policy on free health service for those earning less than Z\$400.00 per month has not worked in favour of local authorities. While on one hand council hospitals and clinics fulfil forthwith the imperatives of this national policy, the centre does not, on the other hand, always recompense the full costs of the service local authorities would have provided in advance on behalf of the centre. The above relationship upsets the budgetary position of councils and their ability to provide the same service in future.

4.2.4 Roads, Water Supply and Sewage

There is a great difference between rural and urban councils in terms of what they can do in providing these services. Urban councils are responsible for the provision of these services from the design to actual development and their maintenance. The provision of water and sanitation services is in fact done before any settlement commences. In other words, it is what is generally termed servicing of stands. The councils normally contract out to private companies most of the work that they do not have capacity to perform. As in the health service, the centre takes long to reimburse local authorities for maintaining state roads that pass through their jurisdiction. Urban councils are mostly affected in this regard.

Water reticulation system and supply is excellent in all urban areas. Ninety nine percent and 94.8 percent of Harare and Kadoma's population have access to piped water. However, Kadoma unlike Harare (which is currently refurbishing its water purification system), has to make do with a system which is now very costly to operate due to the constant break-down of the old equipment. The water crisis is looming on the horizon in this town. This also goes with the sewage system and the local road network. Harare has an upper hand on the provision of roads and their maintenance. By qualifying for the World Bank Urban II projects, Harare City Council is in a much better position to deal with its needs than Kadoma.

District councils have no capacity to provide the required road services and water to their populace. Of all the road network of more than 120 km and 1 400 km for Harava and Gokwe respectively, all have been constructed by the State and/or by the District Development Fund(DDF). About 96 percent and 62 percent of the population within Harava and Gokwe councils respectively have access to either piped or borehole water. This by African standards is highly commendable. However, these statistics do not point to the capacity of council to deliver the goods. Almost 99 percent of the boreholes are donor-funded and have been drilled by DDF and/or by the sector Ministry. The remainder is funded either by council or by self-help schemes by the villagers in need of the service. The capacity problem of the district councils does not only hinge on the lack of the required equipment and monetary resources but also on the needed human resources to deal with civil engineering work needed to put up such facilities and/or supervise the contractors. Suffice it to say that district councils only have limited capacity to maintain some of the installed or developed infrastructure but are handicapped in terms of the actual provision of the service.

4.2.5 *Cleaning of Cities/Towns and Refuse Collection*

This is a contentious issue in urban council areas visited. It is contentious in the sense that the thrust on preventive rather than curative approach to health and environment protection also comes into light. What comes into mind here are two issues: first is the ability of the system to provide the service and second, the existence of problematic areas or spots. Removal of refuse in Harare, although a problem, remains under control (with the introduction of about 31 new bedford trucks 1992) and can still manage to service its suburbs once a week, something which Kadoma admittedly was no longer able to do as its fleet is dilapidated. Assistance is sometimes sought from private companies (Art Corporation in particular) whenever the situation gets out of hand. The failure of Kadoma to qualify for the Urban II World Bank programmes in which the procurement of refuse removal vehicles was budgeted for compounded the situation.

Problems are however also encountered in the vacant spaces where residents dump excess refuse. Street cleaning continue to give problems. The situation is being complicated by vagrants and the retrenchment of cleaners. Harare has its own problems with specific spots like Mbare Musika. The spot is reported almost on a yearly basis in the Department of Health Report as the potential health hazard area.

This is not a service that district councils would usually worry about. However, Gokwe centre unlike Dema growth point (Harava) is fast growing into one of the most dynamic rural towns, hence the growing need for such a service. It is from such specialised services that the district council is arguing for a Town Management Board to be put in place. In trying to stand to the new challenge the district council has mobilised business people at the centre to meet the cost of the refuse collection.

5.0 DETERMINANT VARIABLES: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS

The output of local authorities is a function of many intertwined factors, both internal and external to them. The internal factors explain the absorptive and administrative capacity of the local government authorities i.e, their ability as corporate entities to provide the services to their constituencies. These will be referred to in this study as **direct variables**. Included in this class of variables therefore are the local government resources (buildings, finances, staff, equipment projects) and local government internal administrative system (auditing, planning, work programming, personnel management, incentives, communication).

Consequently, local government output is realised within a determined environment, in other words, there is constant interaction with external elements to themselves. Indirectly, these influence the methods of production, shape, type and size of the output from local authorities. For easy reference they will be addressed to as **indirect variables**. Local government policies, inter-organisational relationships and group politics are the main elements that will be looked at in this section.

5.1 Direct Variables

5.1.1 *Material, Financial and Human Resources*

The availability (or lack of) of these resources explain the level of capacity built at the local level to respond to the demand from their respective constituencies. These resources impact directly on the output or performance of local councils.

5.1.1.1 Administrative Buildings

All local authorities visited indicated that this was not a problem as they all owned the administrative buildings they operate from. Rent is still chargeable to cover expenses incurred on premises in order to show the true cost of the service.

5.1.1.2 Staff

Staffing levels depend on the size of the local authority in question. Generally, urban local authorities employ more staff than district councils. But the indicator for instability of staff establishments is found in the rate of turnover rather than establishment sizes of the respective authorities. Entry qualifications for the different grades of staff are set at the national level.

Over the past 13 years the turnover rates varied from one local authority to another albeit some similar patterns exist in district councils and in urban councils. The categories of staff affected also differed. In Gokwe high rates of turn over were registered in the nursing category, followed by the officers grade and the general hands. Harava's most affected groups are those of officers and the clerical staff in that order. The high rate in the nursing staff category in Gokwe was attributed to lack of accommodation and the poor general working conditions (electricity, water, transport etc.). For the general hands low wages were cited as the major cause. The officers grade employees identified lack of promotion prospects (one can be on the ceiling indefinitely), low salaries and lack of incentives as the major contributory factors to the instability in this category. The reasons for this high turnover rate in this grade were similar in the two districts surveyed. Dishonesty ranks very high on the list of possible causes for the high rate of turnover in the clerical category in Harava.

There is, however, a different pattern in which the turnover rate is affected in urban areas. Instead of a whole category of staff being affected, individual departments tend to be the victims. It was observed that although the rate of turnover was high across the board in the early 1980s as Whites left councils, the situation has stabilised. The department of works for both Harare and Kadoma have been singled out as the most affected over the past 13 years. Experienced engineers and surveyors come out as the categories which are most affected. However, the engineering category tends to be stabilising currently. The Treasurer's department in Kadoma was also seriously affected because of the scarcity of these skills during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The relative scarcity of these skills (nationally) over the past years meant that councils were forced to compete in terms of salaries and incentives on the labour market against the parastatals and the private sector. While competing with parastatals is no longer a problem for Harare and Kadoma, limits on how far their resources can stretch means

that the private sector remains unbeatable.

5.1.1.3 Finances

Own finances provide a measure of the ability and/or lack of it of local authorities to support their own plans and policies on one hand and the level of dependence on the donor community and the central government on the other hand. Finances in all the four local councils interviewed were said to be inadequate. While it is universally understood that funds are never enough it is important to assess the relationship of the income and expenditure of the local authorities under consideration in order to have a clear picture of the (in)adequacy of these resources. The accumulated budget deficit of Kadoma town represents 36% of the total revenue for 1992/93, and Harare's accumulated deficit accounts for 11% of the total income (1991 budget). Gokwe and Harava districts have accumulated a deficit and surplus of 5% and 2% of their total incomes for 1992/93 financial year respectively.

Outstanding loans show the potential of local authorities to engage in capital expenditure as these constitute the major source for capital investment. If only loans owed to the National Housing Fund can be considered, Kadoma's arrear instalment of \$2 704 274.05 represents 21% of the total of \$13 092 992.38. Arrear instalments for Harare and Gokwe represents 0.6% and 10% of their respective total outstanding loan of \$86 649 386.97 and \$887 988.73 respectively.

Although finances are not adequate in all urban and district councils, Kadoma seems to be in an unenviable position. The ability to implement own policies, plans and develop capital infrastructure is very restricted in Kadoma than in the other three local authorities. Harava District Council is the only one with a healthy budget. While Harare City Council and Gokwe District Council have registered deficits, these are manageable compared to that registered by the Kadoma Town Council on one hand. On the other hand Kadoma cannot meet the criteria set for urban councils to qualify for donor aid and simultaneously state assistance to urban councils is minimal.

5.1.1.4 Equipment

The type and quantity of equipment the councils own is an indication of what the councils can do on their own and how they can do it. All the local authorities have what is needed in terms of transport (trucks and small vehicles) to facilitate the day-to-day running of their councils (see tables). District councils are incapacitated when it comes to construction of dams, feeder roads and boreholes as the needed equipment are not available. All they have in this respect is a tractor-drawn grader for Harava and Universal grader for Gokwe. The most that can be done by these two is the maintenance work on the feeder roads.

Kadoma urban does not even own the tractor drawn grader making it impossible to maintain its roads. Although Harare has a considerable pool of graders and caterpillars, front loaders, compressors etc, they fall far short of what is required. However the two urban councils, unlike the districts, possess the required technical capacity to put together and supervise contracted work. While Harava and Gokwe (although the capacity is being developed in Gokwe) can also contract out some works, this is done at a very small scale.

Local councils can have access to the technical expertise and equipment assembled at the central level. District councils have benefited since 1980 from the District Development Fund (and line ministries) technical expertise and equipment for the construction of roads, boreholes and wells. Urban councils also benefit from line ministries' interventions in housing, national roads etc. But the benefit is not translated into capacity building at the local level as the planning, implementation, co-ordination and supervision of these projects is exclusively done at the centre.

There is an array of other types of equipment that councils need in order to provide efficient service to their constituencies besides the heavy equipment. Looking through the list of equipment one can observe that there is a predominance of tractors on the equipment list of Kadoma and water engines on that of Gokwe. Tractors are mainly used for refuse collection in Kadoma as they do not have the conventional refuse collector trucks. However, they are an old fleet which is constantly grounded due to breakdowns. The water engines for Gokwe simply stress the shortage of water in this district, and more so at the busy Gokwe Centre.

Another type of equipment which cannot be overlooked for its importance are the ambulances. The only council out of those surveyed that has been unable to acquire an ambulance is Gokwe. This has been on their plans for quite some time now but resources to purchase at least one are hard to come-by. Harava and Kadoma have one and two respectively and no information was obtained for Harare. It has not been assessed whether the above are adequate for their constituencies.

Not mentioned or listed are the office equipment. Harare is computerised while Kadoma is struggling with its old franking machines, making it virtually impossible to keep pace with the defaulting rate payers. The whole system of resource mobilisation is being negatively affected, reducing the revenue inflow levels and worsening the budgetary position of council in the process. Typewriters and duplicating machines are well within reach of many Councils.

5.1.2 Local Government Internal Administration: Internal Logic

The support system of council has its operational logic which will be addressed to as the internal administration of council. This looks at the planning system, auditing, work programming, monitoring, reviewing of plans, personnel management (recruiting/appraisal, incentives) and communication/meetings. The aim of this section is to establish the areas and extent of involvement by the centre in the running of local councils and the reciprocal relationship which this involvement generates.

5.1.2,1 Planning

A bottom-up approach is on the centre of the district planning system. The process starts by compiling an inventory of required projects at village level (VIDCO see section 3.0 for definition). These are channelled through councillors who are representatives of the Wards, to Council. The planning committee of council with the technical help from the Executive Officer (planning) sifts the projects and set priorities according to the needs of the respective wards. Projects from council administration are married with projects from the respective wards to come up with a District inventory of projects which is submitted for discussion to a full council meeting. This is chaired by the council

chairman. These projects are then sent to the District Development Committee which is the institution with the mandate to put together a district plan.

All heads of sector ministries, parastatals etc. operating within the district and executive officers of Council attend this meeting and their projects are put together with those of the council administration. The District Administrator, as the Chief Executive of Council, chairs the meeting. Before the final draft is sent to the centre via the province for final approval, a joint council - DCC meeting is held to verify the final draft and give it their blessings. It is at this stage (district), through the DDC that the top-down and the bottom-up systems of planning are fused as the sector ministries incorporate their own projects for the district into the plan. At the provincial level district plans are consolidated into the provincial plans. Priorities are also set for funding of district plans from the PSIP vote or from donor funds.

In urban areas the process of planning is supposed to be decentralised to the neighbourhood committees, Wardco (but none of the interviewed residents knew of these institutions). Councillors in urban areas make use of party structures to communicate with their constituencies than the developmental ones. Respective council departments as a rule do the planning for the urban communities. Each department of council produces its own plan which is then discussed by the relevant committees of council. From there the plan is reviewed and verified by full council.

The unified plan of council is expressed in financial terms in the form of a budget. There are no DDCs in urban councils. The budget is sent direct to the centre for approval.

5.1.2.2 Work Programming

Work programming by council reveals the link between the policy and its implementation. It has been observed that very little of what has been planned for is implemented. District councils, like their urban counterparts, take projects that the council as a corporate body feels are a priority for the district as a whole. These are projects which the council's resources can support. In other words, this exercise consists of matching the desired objectives with the available means to achieve them. The council budget is therefore formulated out of this combination.

Urban authorities are faced with the same problem of coordinating the resources with the planned for projects. Scarcity of resources always militates against the intention of planners and implementors. To go round the problem, prioritisation of projects and/or project ranking has to be done. This is inevitable as there are always too many needs chasing scarce resources. Their budgets are therefore a reflection of the above relationship.

Councils' priorities have been biased towards income generating projects in the districts surveyed, with particular reference to Harava. Ward projects were mainly left for sector ministries, donor agencies and self-help schemes. The councils argue that development levies are the main source of ward projects. But as has been observed, very little has been raised from levies. To make the situation worse, sector ministry budgets are minimal, or are administrative in nature. Planning at this stage therefore lacks substance relegating it to a mere shopping list. The DDC is, as a rule, reduced to a co-ordinative instrument.

5.1.2,3 Auditing

The auditing of books is a requirement that local authorities cannot do without as large sums of money are generated and expended (see budgets) in recurrent expenses and capital projects. The district council books are audited by the parent ministry (MLRUD), while the urban councils have their books audited by the Urban Development Corporation (URDCO), a parastatal falling under the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development. The district councils seem to be satisfied with this arrangement. The main reason being the non-payment of fees, as they would not afford the URDCO fees or those charged by private companies.

Kadoma and Harare felt otherwise. They argued that the question of who should audit their books must be left open to the local authorities concerned. However, their feelings do not show any dissatisfaction with the service they get from URDCO. The assumption they entertain is that if different auditing companies are allowed to compete for the service the balance in fees would tilt in favour of local authorities. This also has to do with the fact that they pay for their auditing service and value for money could only be assessed in a free for all situation rather than under a monopoly situation which is currently the order.

5.1.2,4 Personnel Management

The responsibility for recruitment of staff is divided between the centre and the local councils. This relationship is the same for district councils and urban councils. District councils have the responsibility and authority to hire and fire all the support staff to the clerical level. For officers' posts normal channels of recruiting staff are followed and the short-listed applicants are sent to central government for vetting and approval. The urban authorities, only differ with the district councils in this respect in that only the heads of departments are vetted and approved by the centre. Both the district and the urban councils are in favour of this relationship. It is seen as a necessary evil because the exercise weeds out the criminal elements (in the case of district councils) as the records on all current and former council employees are with the Ministry. The vetting process also eliminates any nepotism or favouritism which might arise if the (urban) councils had the final say.

The area of contention between the local authorities and the centre in recruiting staff is the length of time that takes the centre to approve the proposed candidates. This, according to the councils, affects their operations negatively and in certain cases means losing the candidate to other organisations. It was also observed that the delays may not be blamed on the centre only as concerned councils sometimes do not furnish the centre with all the relevant documents. In both circumstances the whole process has to be revisited all over again.

Qualification and experience are the major criteria that are considered in recruiting and appointing the staff in councils. At least a National Diploma in Local Government and University degree are considered the minimum academic qualifications for executive officers in districts and heads of departments in urban councils respectively. Incentives are a major problem in local authorities. These range from basic salaries (district councils) which are considered to be very low, to limited promotion prospects, lack of allowance etc. Lack of incentives is seen as the major factor contributing to the high rate of turnover, particularly in the senior officers grades. District council executive

Officers and their deputies have their salaries paid from government grants and much as the councils would want to pay allowances (as incentives) to the officers, this has to be sanctioned by the centre (which has so far been reluctant to allow councils to give their employees incentive packages). Urban local authorities enjoy some flexibility in this regard. The salaries for urban senior staff (unlike those at the district) are exclusively paid by the councils. Incentive packages are also attached to the relevant posts although the resources factor puts some limits on how much the councils can offer.

5.1.2.5 Communication

There are scheduled meetings, and each member of staff has a copy of the schedule. However, members of staff are reminded of the meetings before the day. This applies to all the meetings of council, departmental meetings, inter-departmental meetings, council committee meetings and full council meetings. Emergency meetings if any are arranged as the situation demands. The respective councils are responsible for the calling of meetings.

5.2 Indirect Variables

Indirect variables explain how local authorities interact with other corporate bodies (central government included) that are involved in the development of the local authorities' areas. The powers and responsibilities delegated to local authorities will be reviewed in this section in an attempt to illuminate on the relationship between the legislative Acts and the actual situation on the ground.

5.2.1 *Local Government Policies*

Values and goals are critical to policy making and are central to the choice of decisions and alternatives. However, value judgement and indeed goal setting are inherently based on subject preferences, beliefs, ideologies and commitments. Looked at institutionally, the difficulty lies in applying professional criteria to an activity which belongs to the 'legitimate value judges', that is, the politicians and the polity as a whole. The main question that could be asked therefore is who makes policies for councils? To provide an adequate answer it is necessary to understand briefly what policy and policy formulation mean. Another important ingredient to be singled out is the context in which policy making and policy formulation are realised.

Policy making is not more than coming up with a strategy which spells out a definite course, a method of action selected from among alternatives and in the light of given conditions, to guide and usually determine present and future decisions. Consequently, the formulation of policy is an act of putting together a projected programme consisting of derived objectives and means to achieve them. The two are not mutually exclusive but the latter is the crystallisation of the former.

Local authorities put together policies for the development of their council areas but this is done within the framework of an Act of Parliament that governs the respective local governments. Anything outside what is provided for in these Acts is not permissible and calls for investigation by the centre.

Councils, both district and urban seem to enjoy a high degree of autonomy in making and formulating policies. An elected body of councillors (full council) is the organ that makes policy at the District and urban council level. The difference between the two councils lies in that, besides the councillors and their executive officers, a representative of central government, the District Administrator, participates in full council meetings in his capacity as the Chief Executive of the district council. However, all the executives sit in these meetings as advisors to council with the DA as the chief advisor. They do not have the voting power, which only the elected councillors have. Urban councils have the town clerk as their chief advisor. He/she is a permanent council employee. As in district councils, executive officers do not have the right to vote. Consequently, for the executive to influence policy it has to lobby the councillors before the full council meeting or during their presentations in council meetings.

The respective committees of council (which include finance committee; education; health; general purpose and administration committee, planning committee etc.) are the organs of council that put together the policies for council. The finance committee is the only one which is provided for by the Act, and council is empowered to form as many committees as they deem necessary for the running of council. The Mayor (urban) or DA and Senior Executive Officers (district) are required by law to attend the meetings of the finance committee. The committee chairmen present their business in full council which is chaired by the mayor, or, the council chairman. Consensus has to be reached for committee's presentation to be implemented. If consensus is not reached then a vote will suffice. This system works well in local authorities where there is less external influence.

This notwithstanding, before the policies adopted by full council are implemented, they are sent for final approval by central government through the province (in the case of district councils). The executive arm of council implements these policies once they are approved, with reviews and appraisals done by the respective committees on behalf of full council.

None of the surveyed local authorities has had their proposed policies turned down or changed in any way by the centre. This could be an indication that at least none of them has proposed anything that is outside the context provided for by their respective Acts. Whether this means autonomy depends on how one would want to interpret it. But the safest bet is that it is "guided autonomy", ie. setting improvement in value judgement and goal setting not by intervening with their basis and justification but by structuring the field within which value judgement and goal setting must take place in order to be relevant to policy making.

5.2.2 Inter-organisational Relationship

Relationships between the centre and local authorities is the subject of this section. More squarely it will look into the following issues:

- type of activities from the centre to local government or the type of activities for which authority is shifted;
- type of powers or authority which is decentralised;
- levels to which power(s) is/are transferred;

- the individuals or organisations to whom the power(s) and activities is/are delegated; and
- the means of transfer.

As discussed earlier on, decentralisation takes many forms and all these forms are not mutually exclusive; they reinforce each other in practice. They can only theoretically be separated one from the other for the purpose of analysis. Thus relations which develop between the centre and the local authorities (as corporate bodies) are therefore not more than an expression of the concatenation of the different varieties of these different forms of decentralisation.

5.2.2,1 Power and Authority

District and urban councils are empowered by the Act of Parliament (District Councils Act and Urban Councils Act) to perform a number of functions and also certain powers are conferred on them. The following are the functions and areas which councils have the power and authority within the law to perform:

- Call elections within their spatial unit;
- Elect their own chairman from the elected councillors;
- Carry out any act the council feels necessary or desirable in the interests of all or some of the inhabitants;
- Develop the council area, ie. prepare, implement and monitor development plans and policies within the council areas;
- Charge owners and occupiers of land within councils such amounts as the council may fix in respect of property let by council, or fixed deposits payable in connection with any services provided by council;
- Impose a land development levy upon all who are owners of rural land within the council area, owners of mining operations, or licensed dealers who carry on business within the jurisdiction of council;
- Incur any expenditure not exceeding \$200.00 (District Council) without seeking approval; and
- Recruitment of support staff and senior staff.

However the approval of the minister is a requirement stipulated in the respective Acts of local governments.

5.2.2,2 Sector Ministries

Sector ministries have field officers at the district level who implement the line ministries projects and provide the necessary feedback to their headquarters. While the officials are responsible for the implementation of their line ministries projects and the provision of services, they do not have the power to make decisions. That power resides with the ministry's head office. Parastatal organisations as well have the same mode of operation. More interesting though is the fact that the field officers from ministries and parastatals are not in any way answerable (administratively and operationally) to council,

which is the policy making body at the district level. This creates a variety of problems for the districts' policies in areas like education and health and the implementation of the district plan.

5.2.2,3 The District Administrator

The office of the District Administrator comes into light when coordination of the activities of the line ministries and parastatals at the district level is raised. Who is the District Administrator and what is his role?

The District Administrator is the senior government representative at the district level, and with his staff they are the most important link between the government and the rural population. Their task is two pronged: first, they inform the population about government policy and encourage them to accept agricultural and other development practices; and second, the population channel their grievances, local needs and aspirations to government through the DA's office. Justifiably constant appeals are made to him for advice on the most desirable way to approach problems and to deal with the rural population. The DA arbitrates in many local disputes between individuals (eg. land), between traditional leaders and their subjects, between officials and the public etc.

More importantly though, the DA is on the centre of district affairs. As the Chief Executive of the District Council she/he is one of the signatory of the council cheques. She/he also attends the meeting of the Finance Committee. District Development Committee meetings and the joint DDC and Council meetings are chaired by the DA. In this role his/her office coordinates the departmental activities of line ministries and parastatals with those of the districts administration. The former organisations however, are not under the supervision of the DA. The activities of the District Development Fund (a quasi-governmental institution) are coordinated from the DA's office.

The relationship between the DA and the Senior Executive Officer (Head of the District Administration) is a delicate one. Discord cannot be avoided at the district level if there is no good communication between the two. The unfortunate thing is that once a situation of discord prevails councillors tend to listen to the DA than to their employee. In spite of the above, the fact that at this crucial stage (district level) there is no one with authority to respond to proposals from below makes the position of the DA more co-ordinative than authoritative. The major handicap of this office however is that it only receives an administrative budget and the impact of the DA on the progressive development of the area is minimal. But even with the reduced powers of this office (eg. death and birth certificates, salaries for teachers etc. are no longer under the DA's office), the tradition and prestige which was built up around this office during colonial days persist.

Urban areas, although some of them fall within the spatial unit under the DA's office, are not themselves under his/her jurisdiction. The Urban Councils Act that governs the cities/and towns does not have the provision for a DA. The chief adviser to Council is the Town Clerk who is the most senior employee of Council. However the other structures, from the neighbourhood committees to council, are moulded along those of districts. This also goes with functions and powers delegated to the council serve for very few areas. The Urban Councils Act does not restrict urban councils particularly cities to specified sources of revenue. Towns however, cannot raise financial resources on the open market like their counterparts (cities of Harare and Bulawayo).

The role of central government takes different shades with respect to the two types of local authorities. Control, co-ordinative, supportive and supervisory were all mentioned when interviewees were asked to characterise the relationship between the district council and the centre. In urban areas, the relations were characterised as those of monitoring and control.

5.2.3 *Group Politics*

Council business is influenced by different actors. It is therefore important at this stage to highlight the possible channels through which council politics is influenced, either from below or from above.

Three channels of communication are functional at the district level while only two exist in urban councils. The traditional hierarchical line of communication starts with the Kraal head to the Headman and the Chief. Party structures commence with the cell, branch and district level, while the Planning structure starts with the Vidco, Wardco to the DDC. The latter two lines of communication represent the political and developmental needs of the people respectively.

But notwithstanding the seemingly clear division of responsibilities between the two (party and planning structures), there is marriage or a fusion of the two systems at the Ward level. Ward councillors are elected on a party ticket. In other words it is safe to say that they are mandated to advancing the developmental policy of their parties at the district or urban council level. Councillors are therefore accountable to two masters ie. the electorate and the party supremos (assuming that the agenda of the party supremos is different from that of the local constituency). If the increased numbers of candidates (ZANU PF members) standing for elections as independents can be taken as a measure of the divergence of agenda between the two, then the issue of wearing two hats becomes difficult to dismiss. Imposition of candidates has been singled out as the main reason for the emergence of the independents.

The argument that council policies are externally influenced also gains credibility. In local governments surveyed, independents were observed in Harare and Harava. It is in these same local authorities that possible external influence in policy making was recorded. Surprisingly however, these allegations were made by executive officers while the councillors who are in the main, victims of such machinations, answered otherwise.

5.2.3.1 *Composition of Councillors*

Other possible sources of political influence were observed and looked into. These included the class composition of councillors and "absentee councillors". The composition of councillors was noted as a potential source of influence on the direction and nature of policies made and formulated by council. Gokwe councillors are predominantly peasant farmers and about 62 percent peasant farmers in Harava. Of the two urban local authorities Harare had a bigger share of its councillors made up of business people and Kadoma's were a mixed bag dominated by the middle management level.

The business minded approach to policy development (and easy access to the corridors of power for Harare) in Harare and Harava can also be attributed to the composition of their respective councils. The thrust in Harava is on the development of income generating projects while Harare emphasises on cost recovery for service provided. The failure to raise the development levy (only \$50 000 was raised from 1986) can also be credited to the above factor as the lack of resources was ruled out as the constraint to raising revenue from development levy by both the agricultural extension (Agritex) official in the area and the Executive Officers. Political resistance to the levy was mentioned by councillors and executives. A lack of a coordinated political mobilisation campaign gains credibility. The development of Dema Growth Point (a growth centre in Harava District) could also be attributed to the resistance by the local business community to competing investors as its proximity to Harare and the growth point incentives would have worked to its advantage than otherwise.

Statistics have shown that Gokwe did not fare better in the collection of the levy. The reason for the poor showing has been put as that of successive droughts and the method of collection used. But one important factor has also emerged which shows the dynamics of different groups in trying to influence policy. The phenomenal growth of Gokwe Centre has been attributed to the campaign by the peasant councillors to attract "external investors" from Kwekwe and Kadoma. Although this move upset the indigenous business people, the locals have seen the coming of the external investors as a stabilising factor as competition brought down prices and goods to the district. This has worked to the advantage of the local community who do not have to go to Kwekwe to buy groceries, agricultural inputs etc. It has been however, a nightmare to the indigenous business people who, faced by the influx of the big business and the insensitiveness of council to their pleas and problems, formed the Gokwe Business Association to try and influence council politics' from below.

The argument by the indigenous businessmen, though, is valid. While the influx of external investors stabilises the prices and increases the access of goods, to locals, it also drives the indigenous business people out of business in the process. They argue that prices could also be stabilised if the external investors invest their capital in the manufacturing of the different products right at the centre, and leave them to do the retailing. The financial resource base for council is increased, employment created and industrial development of the district strengthened in the process. In other words they are against external investors as long as they invest in the retail sector. However, the politics rage on. A new dimension is emerging. The rapid expansion of Gokwe Centre is threatening surrounding peasants, as they will eventually give way to the expanding rural town. Signals of resistance are already flashing - as some councillors are campaigning against Gokwe applying for town status.

Kadoma seems to be a special case. The predominance of the middle class (without enough political or economic clout) has failed to draw sympathy from politicians in Harare. Investment, as a rule, is static and the rate of unemployment is on the increase. Although some solidarity has been developed between the councillors and the executives, it is best to be termed "solidarity in poverty". The political thrust which unites the two forces and its possible implications on the council was captured by the Chairman of the finance committee in 1990/91 when he noted that "the quality of our leadership shall be judged not by the extent to which we shy away from reality, but by the extent to which we are courageous enough to face our citizens and convey to them in very cheap terms the reality of our finance situation and that they have to respond appropriately".

5.2.3,2 Resident Councillors Versus Absentee Councillors

Another point of contention was whether by residing in the areas they represent councillors are prone to more or less pressure from external or internal forces. Two lines of arguments were noted. The argument is that councillors who live in their wards understand the feelings and problems of (and identify with) their people more than the ones who only come to address rallies. A counter argument and mostly from the "absentee councillors" (those who do not reside in the wards they represent) was that the calibre of the councillors is what matters. In line with the above arguments the study noted that of all the areas where councillors resided in their wards there was a favourable response to meetings of council than in areas where there are "absentee councillors." It was also pointed out that those who live outside their wards were more prone to external than internal influence. This is, nevertheless, difficult if not impossible to substantiate.

5.2.3,3 Traditional Structures

The traditional structures of communication were at 1980 demobilised of the source of their influence. The judicial powers they possessed before independence and the traditional authority over land and its distribution/allocation and the power to resolve land disputes etc were all invested in the new judicial structures under the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, and in the President (who is represented at the local level by the councillor, the DA and PA respectively depending on the hierarchical level in question). This notwithstanding relations were maintained between the three structures as the traditional structure still commanded legitimacy in the eyes of the rural people. The land allocation method and the change in the method of mobilising development levy testifies to the above.

Chiefs and Headmen are involved in the identification of land (as traditional boundaries still hold) before councillors put their final stamp. The unyielding development levy is more likely to be influenced by the traditional structures than by promises for future development. It could be from the realisation that district councils are consistently failing to raise more than half of the planned targets that they have now empowered the Headmen to collect the development levy. Previously councillors collected levies during rallies but not much was forthcoming. Although the results are not yet visible there is no doubt that councils have now realised that this new strategy coupled with political mobilisation is the only way out. The disbursement of the mobilised resources still remains the preserve of the development structures. The possibility of a strong influence from the traditional structures on constraining development can not be ruled out.

Chiefs also sit in council meetings as ex-officio members. Of late government is restoring limited judiciary powers to the chiefs, a move seen by many as a result of the pressure mounted from below.

6.0 IMPACT OF DECENTRALISATION ON THE PERFORMANCE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES

The impact of decentralisation policy on local authorities' performance can only be assessed from the changes which occurred to two important indicators discussed in the early sections of this article. First is the ability of local authorities to mobilise internal resources and, second, is the provision of different services to their communities. A clear distinction should however be made between the focus of this section - namely measurement of the effect - and the major concern of the public, that is effectiveness. "What happened and to what extent" - as opposed to - "Was what happened desirable?" - is the concern of this section.

The factors that contribute to the changes in performance indicators have also been discussed in the preceding sections, and in particular the section on "Determinant Variables", both internal and external. Correlationship between performance and these variables therefore becomes very important in appraising and interpreting the level and meaning of the changes recorded in the different indicators.

6.1 Local Authorities' Finances and the Role of the State

Two important questions need to be asked at this juncture: Who should fund decentralisation - the state or local authorities? Does more decentralisation mean more financial resources at the local level? These questions also bring in contention the devolution - deconcentration dichotomy, where the local level structures (mostly the technocrats) are arguing for more powers and at the centre, small-scale incremental dispersion of functions and power is favoured.

Over the years (from 1980) local governments have developed the capacity to mobilise internal resources (increased revenue from income generating projects, development levy etc.) albeit they continue to depend on the state coffers for their financial needs. The average dependence rate for district and urban councils is around 44% and 3% respectively. For district councils there is a remarkable decrease in the dependence ratio, from 90% (Wekwete, 1988) during much of the first half of the 1980s. However, this equation does not imply that district councils can stand on their own once the Central Government withdraws its involvement. To the contrary it means that the state has been decentralising responsibilities without equally distributing the resources to match them. Income generating projects and other indirect revenue yielding schemes improvised by the state (e.g. beer levy) and the intervention of donor agencies have in a way compensated for the void created by falling grants from the centre.

In urban councils the dependence ratio is considerably low and there was a downward movement in the dependence ratio of 3.7% in 1981-83 (ibid). However, support from the centre is concentrated in such sensitive areas as health and education. The constant decrease of these grants affected the budgetary position of urban councils. Cross-subsidisation of different individual accounts of council, to make for the falling grants, has only served to weaken the viable accounts, negatively affecting the capacity of council to revitalise the once viable accounts.

The assumption on which the above relationship between the state and local authorities is built is that the more responsibilities the centre delegates to the local levels the more the pressure on them (local authorities) to deliver and/or to source for revenues from other alternative sources like income generating projects and alternatively from donor agencies. The establishment of the department of Planning (on the encouragement of the centre) whose staff salaries are not covered by government grants points to the validity of this assumption.

6.1.1 State Monopoly of Fiscal Revenue and Expenditure Power

The centre still monopolises fiscal revenue and expenditure power. The monopoly is manifest in two ways. First is that the centre approves any price adjustments which local authorities recommend in an attempt to strike an economic balance between the cost of providing the service and the actual market price of the service. This deprives the local authorities of the flexibility to timely mobilise the planned resources, resulting in crippling budget deficits, shelving of planned projects and/or provision of substandard services. It is the cost and benefit of this approach to both councils and central government that needs to be addressed. Secondly, the centre does not have a formula of sharing the resources that accrue to its coffers from different taxes with the local authorities. By denying local authorities a share of the resources raised in their areas the centre is overlooking the overwhelming need to involve the respective local communities in managing and making use of their own resources.

Technocrats are undermined in the process, hence their consistent call for a devolved form of decentralisation which combine responsibilities and fiscal power. Conversely politicians at the local level acceded to the deconcentrated form of decentralisation, meaning also that their authority over shaping state politics is more dependent on party politics than on legislative provision.

Consensus has it that decentralisation is a means to an end and not an end in itself. To achieve the end result therefore there is need to strengthen the decentralised administrative structures and the democratic representative system through the distribution of information and resources from the centre to the local levels and vice versa. The call therefore has been directed at conferring more autonomy or authority on councils to enable them to raise local financial resources and widen the revenue base. Some of the potential sources mentioned included the following:

1. Crop levy
2. Transporters' fees charged on operators from outside the district
3. Mineral Operations Royalties
4. Decontrol of land lease and license charges and prices for services
5. Taxation on undeveloped land
6. Sharing of sales, income and excise tax revenue
7. Taxes on scotch carts, cattle, bicycles etc.

These proposed sources will however benefit others, in this case councils like Gokwe (because of its dynamic economy and natural resources endowment) and Harare (because it has a developed economic infrastructure and speculation on land).

Comforting though is the fact that those who benefit do not do so at the expense of Kadoma and Harava or others that fall in their category.

The above scenario indicates that more devolution of powers to local levels does not necessarily mean that resources will accrue to all local authorities in the same manner nor does it point to the enhanced capacity to mobilise resources in those councils which have the potential. But this would definitely assist in identifying the strong contenders and the weak ones, and in turn would make the intervention of the state more purposeful and more focused. However, concern was raised on the extent to which (in the case of the strong contenders) the potential resources outlined above could be exploited without triggering negative social, economic and political consequences. Councillors were more sceptical, particularly on the practicability of exploiting the above sources, and the possible emergency of "local sharks" who would want to benefit more at the expense of the majority.

The proactive approach by local level technocrats again meets with a hurdle in the scepticism displayed by local level politicians. The conflicting relationship between the politicians and technocrats in district councils, however, serves to strengthen the political base of the national level ruling elite in rural areas. The position is nevertheless different in urban council areas. Here the position of politicians is undermined when councils fail to deliver. This is mainly so because politicians in rural areas are not currently judged by their ability to deliver through council structures as in urban areas, but by their intervention to avert crises through party and higher echelons of state power. In this regard the reluctance by the centre to devolve fiscal power is not without a strong base.

The ideal arrangement would accordingly be that the state budget and with it relevant information (through line ministries) be decentralised to local government level as this strengthens the position of both technocrats and politicians without much negative consequences. Coordination of the implementation process should be made the responsibility of district councils themselves with technical assistance from the line ministries.

State assistance will, according to this arrangement, remain a central component of the decentralisation policy in both district and urban councils. Statistics for Gokwe and Harava districts point to the above and so do those for urban councils. Total locally generated revenue for Gokwe only cover 91% of their recurrent expenditure and about 50% of Harava's internally generated income comes from beer levy. In urban areas, state grants account for not less than 24% of the total councils' budgets for health and education.

Reduction of the level of grants and therefore of the proportion of state assistance in urban councils budgets have negatively affected the provision of services, through freezing of nursing posts and shortage of drugs, hot-sitting in schools, sharing of textbooks etc. Price increases in health and education as a cost recovery mechanism will (and have before) only contributed to reduced attendance by the intended beneficiaries. District councils on their part will have to forego any capital developments on their plans once the state withdraws its support, with negative multiplier effects on all the council structures and donor projects, whose long-term sustainability is linked to the performance of local governments.

6.2 Services Provision

The appraisal of the performance indicators (services provision) in the four local authority case study areas demonstrates that there are well performing local governments and others that are exhibiting some improvements in performance. There are also those that are performing dismally and/or are deteriorating continuously.

The two district councils analysed performed well above average in the provision of infrastructure (roads, boreholes, servicing of stands at growth points) accommodation, schools and health facilities. Two intertwined factors contributed to the above. First and most important is the intervention of Non-Governmental Organisations (financially and expertise) and District Development Fund (DDF) which is a quasi-governmental agency for rural development. Second, is the ability of the local council (technocrats and politicians) to mobilise and coordinate rural communities to participate in projects carried out in their wards.

Line ministries' intervention was peripheral due mainly to budgetary constraints while council resources were diverted almost exclusively to income generating projects. Very little was mobilised from development levy (which is intended for ward development purposes). The main handicap at the district level is the lack of financial resources, technical expertise, equipment and the high rate of turnover in the officers and professional categories. The non-accountability of line ministries and parastatals to local authorities creates a confusing environment which has led to duplication of responsibilities and unco-ordinated use of resources. All these factors have contributed negatively to the actual performance of district councils.

Besides the interlocking relationship between performance and the determinant variables discussed earlier on, the changes or progress in the provision of services can also be explained by the contextual variables i.e. historical and natural conditions and the political and economic conditions. Harava had most of its infrastructure (roads, schools, health facilities) developed before 1980. This gave Harava an advantage over Gokwe which only saw meaningful development after independence.

Urban councils (Harare and Kadoma) studied are a typical example of the existence of a good performer (Harare) and of one which is deteriorating continuously (Kadoma). The major source of the contrast can be located on the impact which determinant variables have on performance (the capacity of local authorities to deliver) and also the influence of contextual variables (in particular differences in political support for different local governments). Service provision in Kadoma Urban Council is continuously lagging behind demand and the capacity to provide service is deteriorating unabated as financial resources nose dive and political support is taking a back seat. Equipment, finances, staff (in critical departments), and income generating projects are well in a state which cannot by normal standards be expected to sustain and maintain the existing facilities, let alone develop new ones. Population pressure, although growing at an average of 5% per annum (national average 3.9) cannot entirely be to blame for the lackluster performance by council.

Harare has managed to sustain and maintain the existing infrastructure thanks to the prudent budget management, stable rate of staff turnover, availability of needed equipment and probably strong political support from the central government.

However, the development of new facilities has not matched the exponential increase in demand, caused mainly by the influx of people not only from rural areas but from other urban areas.

This last factor (influx of people) could provide the clue to understanding why decentralisation is defined differently by different local authorities interviewed. Although all were agreed that decentralisation was still on paper, they differed on what they would want done to be satisfied that decentralisation was off the ground. While Harare seemed to be dump-founded when the question was posed (for obvious reasons) Kadoma argued that investment should be redirected from Harare to small towns like Kadoma. District councils were agreed that a decentralised budget to councils would strengthen their capacity to deal with developmental projects from their constituency and therefore legitimatise and develop the social base of their institutions. After some pose Harare thought that decentralisation would be practical if the Town Management Boards are revisited, as their main enemy was their own bureaucracy.

6.3 Difference in Performance Across Councils

The uniform legislative framework which regulates in a very detailed way the structures, organisation and relations among the substructures of the respective local authorities assumes that all local authorities constituencies are subject to the same historical and natural conditions and enjoy the same amount of political and economic support from the centre. This assumption leads to widening of differences and declining central government capacity to counteract it. The comparative example of Kadoma and Harare is testimony to the above situation. Although these discrepancies were not evident in district councils studied because of a combination of interrelated factors, the same cannot be said if the case study area is widened. However, even in the case of the two districts in question, their budgetary structures reveal that there exist immense differences in their economic base, historical and natural conditions etc.

To avoid a situation where disadvantaged local authorities fail to perform their duties (including mobilising resources) the centre needs to develop the capacity to identify those areas in which respective local authorities are disadvantaged either naturally or by man-made errors and compliment them. In other words uniform decentralisation (as stipulated in the respective Acts) is not the solution to local government problems; it is only but a point of departure.

The autonomy that local authorities enjoy through decentralised administrative and democratic structures, responsibilities and authority can not be a substitute to institutional capacity building at, and financial empowerment of, the lower levels of government. Developing capacity to carry out programme and projects effectively at the local level is the necessary condition for the development of reciprocal relationships with other organisations and for precipitating active and sustained involvement by the local communities.

Identifying the potential and level of existing capacity in all the local levels of government by the centre becomes the starting point. This approach would facilitate the reaction by the centre to widening of performance differences across local authorities, which might crystallise into political overtones which can even threaten the political legitimacy not only of councils but also of the state.

6.4 Co-production

It would be logical that the limited capacity of local authorities to adequately provide service to their inhabitants coupled with the non-affordability of the provided services by the majority of the people within the council's jurisdiction would prompt the emergence of self-help community based groups. Indeed social groups at the local level are taking collective action to make up for what the councils are no longer able to provide. Housing stands shoulders above the rest as the service which has proved difficult to provide in urban council areas. Correspondingly housing cooperatives have emerged in Harare from the second half of the 1980s increasing from 10 in 1989 to 35 at present. Together they have a total membership of nearly 7 000 people, almost 9 percent of the total number of people on the waiting list. About 73 percent of the total membership earn less than \$500.00 and cannot afford council houses even if they are availed to them. Although the cooperatives have managed to curve their way through to councillors, executives and top party politicians and government officials, they faced unsurmountable resistance from both councils, which considered them illegal and from politicians, who suspected them of creating new political constituencies.

District councils do not have such experiences yet. Notwithstanding, Gokwe District has its own new phenomenon in the Gokwe Business Association which was established at the Gokwe Centre in 1992. The association is a grouping of indigenous business people (see discussion above) who pioneered the centre during the difficult times. The major reason for its formation was to defend their interests which are being threatened by the influx of well established retailer shops and wholesalers. The only way to protect their interests is by influencing council business as they are resident in the area, hence their pressure for representation in council. Harava business people are well represented in council so much that any threat to their existence can easily be defeated. The council chairman is himself a prominent businessman at the Centre. The process of penetration from below is evident in both district councils.

Surprising enough, of the two urban councils surveyed only Harare has experienced the formation of this movement. Kadoma, regardless of the severe shortage of housing, has not yet registered any housing cooperatives. But like Harare, it has its share of illegal backyard shacks. This however, indicates that for the "third sector" to emerge other contributory factors beyond "demand gap argument" should be at play.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The impact of decentralisation policy on the performance of local governments has been assessed by carrying out an evaluation of selected performance indicators, namely, resource mobilisation and service provision. Factors which would possibly affect these services were also examined. They were categorised into direct and indirect variable.

The decentralisation strategy adopted by the Zimbabwean government is characterised be ceding of power through small scale incremental transfers of authority and responsibilities to local authorities. This process is reciprocated by an apparent withdrawal by the centre from local level affairs. Practically this approach only applies

to the rural areas of Zimbabwe (district councils) as the urban areas already enjoyed much more powers and autonomy even before 1980. The one city concept (which is an exercise initiated at independence aimed at involving the indigenous Zimbabweans in council affairs) is the only new dimension added to urban local authorities.

The approach outlined above has two sides to it. The first is that it is gradual and judicious. This indeed is its strong point as the ceding of power and responsibilities is considered carefully and only after assessing the resources on hand and the possible impact of the move on many other economic, social and political levels. The second side is that it generates the tendency by those who cede authority and responsibilities to centralise both authority and resources on the pretext that absorptive capacity does not exist at the local levels and that the disposable resources at the centre are so limited that by spreading them thinly the desired results can not be realised. However, responsibilities are easily delegated.

Mismatch between resources and responsibilities is created. To fill in this gap in district councils two factors need to be mentioned. These are the intervention of the NGOs and District Development Fund which is a quasi-governmental organisation. Local authorities resourcefully responded to the above mismatch by quantitatively increasing revenues generated within their districts, and mobilisation of their communities around projects implemented in their areas. What did not develop nonetheless is the capacity of the District Councils to provide these services themselves. Urban councils had the capacities to provide services developed well before independence. Mismatches between resources and responsibilities were mainly as a result of policy directives from the centre which included control regime (this in part also affects district councils); services provided by councils on behalf of the state etc (state not compensating for the services of doing so late). The cost recovery approach (which is the backbone of urban councils) has been constantly tempered with in the process, disrupting the provision of services and the very capacity of councils to provide for their communities.

Three broad policy areas need to be highlighted in order to go beyond the current policy debate on decentralisation. First, state budget and with it relevant information (through line ministries) should be decentralised to local government level as this strengthens the position of both technocrats and politicians without much negative consequences. Co-ordination of the formulation, planning and implementation process should be the responsibility of district councils themselves with technical assistance from line ministries experts.

Second, to avoid a situation where disadvantaged local authorities fail to provide services due to policy directives or to natural, economic and historical factors, the centre has to develop the capacity of mechanism to speedily identify the affected councils with a view of complementing their effort.

Third and by its long term nature most important is that administrative and democratic structures, responsibilities and authority cannot be a substitute to institutional capacity building and financial empowerment. What is important is to develop the capacity at the local level to carry out programme and projects, and create the necessary conditions (economic opportunities) for the active participation of the different civic organisations and communities.

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CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE CASE STUDY AREAS

KADOMA TOWN COUNCIL

Kadoma is situated 141 kilometres from the country's capital Harare on the main road and rail links to Bulawayo and the South. It occupies a gently sloping site which is dissected by a ridge draining in easterly westerly directions. The geological formations are pre-dominantly volcanic with high mineral content. Kadoma is located in Natural Geographic Region IIb hence characterised by a seasonal rainfall average of 770 cubic centimetres and mild temperatures ranging from 22 degrees celsius in winter and 33 degrees celsius in summer.

These climatic conditions and soil characteristics combine to make the Kadoma area conducive to agricultural production. At present, the concentration is on cash crops such as cotton, tobacco, seed crop and maize.

With an annual growth rate of 9,3% the population of Kadoma currently stands at 98,600 of which 47 100 are females. These are housed in six suburbs of which three are high density. Housing occupancy averages 10 people per house.

The manufacturing sector is the largest employer of labour followed by the distributing sector. Recent industrial development has brought a situation of diversification i.e. Glass factory, Tissue Mill, Fine Paper Mill, Plastic Factory, Tanning Industry and Oil Extraction Factory. The largest employer, however, is the mining sector (Eiffel Flats) employing about 7 000 workers of the total work-force within the municipal area of approximately 16 000.

The production of gold in this region has accounted for a third of the total national output. The area is also rich in base minerals, principally copper, nickel and platinum as well as chrome magnetite and limestone. Also situated in Kadoma is the Nickel Refinery which treats nickel from mines outside Zimbabwe.

The Grain Marketing Board, Cold Storage Commission and the Dairy Marketing Board all have depots in Kadoma. The Cotton Research Institute and a ginnery are also situated in Kadoma, a major cotton growing area.

Besides communal activities with large chain-stores and supermarkets and major commercial banks and financial institutions Kadoma also boasts of an informal sector based largely on the use of cotton products to make artifacts and handcrafts ranging from blankets to quilts and table mats.

GOKWE DISTRICT COUNCIL

Situated 281 kilometers from the capital Harare, Gokwe District has an estimated population of 360 400 with average population growth of 4,7% per annum. Gokwe District is the most northerly in the Midlands Province and shares common boundaries with the administrative districts of Kadoma and Karoi to the north-east, Kadoma and Kwekwe to the east, Nkayi to the south and Lupane and Binga to the south-west. Its total

area is 18 140km or 1 814 000 ha, (1/11 of total of Zimbabwe).

Served by major rivers such as Sanyati and Sengwa, the district is rich in many mineral deposits such as coal, gold and nickel. The district has an abundant wildlife with considerable numbers of elephant, buffalo, antelope, kudu and large predators such as lions and leopards.

Lying in agro-ecological regions 3,4 & 5 the minimum annual rainfall of Gokwe is 650mm slightly below the national average of 674mm. The soils are predominantly deep Kalahari sands hence the districts boom in cotton, maize, sorghum, millet and sunflower.

The district, however has a generally underdeveloped infrastructure especially the road network system. Road construction by the District Development Fund (DDF) currently being undertaken will improve the lot of farmers who are at present handicapped by the cost of obtaining goods and agricultural inputs and the difficulty of getting their produce to markets. Commercial activity is centred at 1 Growth Point, 17 Rural Service Centres and 252 Business Centres. Crop Marketing facilities exist at 3 Grain Marketing Board Depots, 3 Cotton Marketing Depots and several approved Grain Buyers.

Communications have been greatly improved by the introduction of a Post Office at the Growth Point and postal agencies in outlying areas. The boom in agri-business has also lured the country's major commercial banks to Gokwe. The Growth Point itself is a hive of activity to large nationwide chain-stores. A hotel, garages, small scale sector of informal industry compliment the busy Growth Point.

HARAVA DISTRICT COUNCIL

Situated about 36 kilometres along the Harare-Marondera road. Harava district covers a total of 5 601 hectares mostly occupied by peasant farmers with little production output. Harava's estimated population stands at 28 500 who are mainly curtailed in their agricultural production potential by the sandy and infertile soils. However rainfall averages are satisfactory with a seasonal average of 950 cubic centimetres and annual mean temperatures are around 18 degrees Celsius but frost is common in winter. Communal farmers mainly depend on maize and groundnuts for consumption but market excess produce to the Grain Marketing Board. Poor agricultural performance is attributed to the poor soils whose low fertility needs to be complimented by inputs of agricultural chemicals and fertilizers. However, regardless of these limiting factors agricultural production in Harava has improved tremendously since 1981. In 1981 farmers produced 51,620 bags of maize and 350 bags of edible beans but in 1992 they produced 118 800 bags of maize and 700 bags of edible beans respectively.

Harava's proximity to the country's capital city, Harare, where infrastructural development is up to required standards has robbed it of potential industrial development. Electricity is adequate, water is easily available as it is located within Harare's catchment area, labour is in excess and industrial stands are far much affordable than in Harare but poor infrastructural development and a lackluster campaign for developmental projects by the district council officials are mainly to blame for Harava's dismal development performance.

However, Dema Growth Point boasts of a number of commercial enterprises ranging from general dealers shops, bottle stores, a garage and a hotel.

HARARE CITY COUNCIL

Harare is the political and administrative capital of Zimbabwe. Its area is currently estimated at 559 km/sq but keeps enlarging because of the construction of outlying suburbs to accommodate the ever increasing population currently estimated at 1 121 468.

All various sector ministries have their headquarters in this metropolitan centre. The country's chief law-makers/legislators are housed in Harare as is the highest institution of learning and research, The University of Zimbabwe.

All major companies and parastatals except the National Railways of Zimbabwe have their head offices in Harare. Multi-national co-operations have established themselves in Harare - the second largest city in Southern Africa after Johannesburg. Sixty-three Diplomatic Missions are housed in this city. Major local International hotels are part and parcel of Harare as is the Harare International Airport, the only one in the country.

The Harare City Council is the administrative authority of the city which is demarcated into forty-two (42) Wards for purposes of representation in Council Chambers. Harare boasts of a diversified and sophisticated infrastructure characterised by a well developed manufacturing industry undoubtedly the largest employers in the city. More than 70% of Zimbabwe's manufacturing industry takes place in the country's two largest cities of Harare and Bulawayo. The country's financial sector which consists of a wide range of banking institutions, insurance companies and the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange which forms the hub of the financial sector have fully established themselves in Harare.

The city, obviously a hive of capacity, has monopolised industry and commerce at the detriment of other up-coming towns like Bulawayo, Gweru, Mutare etc hence it has been nick-named "Bambazonke" - a Ndebele dictum for a selfish grabber "all - taker". However as is common with all major metropolitans Harare has its own share of social ills like the critical accommodation and transport crises. Destitutes paint a gloomy social picture of the political, administrative and financial capital of Zimbabwe.

APPENDIX

Table I

	1980-1981	1981-1982	1982-1983
\$23Million			
Accounts			
Expenditure			
Rates	20,341,796.00	21,912,176.00	24,886,133.00
Water	29,417,720.00	38,397,802.00	47,876,522.00
Estates	324,560.00	5,112,450.00	5,780,473.00
Sewerage		552,040.00	727,822.00
Housing	549,093.00	482,734.00	470,413.00
Parking	794,158.00	1,068,265.00	1,269,896.00
Housing (LGA)	11,686,929.00	11,827,358.00	13,856,908.00
Welfare	833,585.00	13,424,555.00	2,049,764.00
Waste Management		1,478,840.00	1,616,468.00
Electricity	21,554,916.00	28,641,781.00	36,414,361.00
Trad. Beer	11,609,728.00	22,627,560.00	28,055,954.00
Totals	63,947,841.00	82,166,220.00	98,534,399.00
Income			
Rates	30,263,067.00	36,562,641.00	54,374,912.00
Water	74,517,980.00	16,359,765.00	3,541,254.00
Estates	6,323,915.00	8,719,112.00	9,725,183.00
Sewerage	1,816,297.00	892,380.00	1,110,301.00
Estates	550,524.00	564,644.00	578,331.00
Jpsipong	1,816,297.00	1,687,350.00	1,870,543.00
Parking	12,012,700.00	20,673,855.00	6,872,156.00
Housing (LGA)	1,939,867.00	2,727,718.00	3,102,629.00
Welfare	234,260.00	2,719,765.00	20,955,644.00
Water	60,038,482.00	57,397,530.00	87,142,101.00
Electricity	38,156,244.00	41,918,224.00	2,738,937.00
Trad. Beer			
Totals	129,828,785.00	146,750,979.00	197,916,472.00
Income			
Rates	29,813,176.00	34,309,107.00	46,379,596.00
Water	70,388,083.00	13,788,617.00	3,129,972.00
Waste Management	7,007,385.00	720,000.00	8,965,264.00
Sewerage	731,289.00	2,079,622.00	2,789,163.00
Estates	504,567.00	578,331.00	10,313,333.00
Jpsipong	1,473,674.00	1,803,619.00	2,001,284.00
Parking	15,427,562.00	13,433,195.00	10,336,199.00
Housing (LGA)	1,939,865.00	3,102,629.00	2,951,527.00
Welfare	2,543,182.00	2,816,234.00	14,504,512.00
Water	56,189,223.00	59,600,129.00	90,883,402.00
Electricity	35,346,427.00	45,479,713.00	3,509,906.00
Trad. Beer			
Totals	129,828,785.00	138,682,625.00	183,023,012.00

	1986-1987		1987-88		1988-89	
	Expenditure	Income	Expenditure	Income	Expenditure	Income
Rates	66,731,197.00	58,592,386.00	74,376,920.00	67,531,345.00	93,343,101.00	90,044,465.00
Waste Management	4,437,348.00	4,086,640.00	4,634,736.00	4,387,971.00	5,403,617.00	5,764,347.00
Sewerage	11,191,881.00	12,401,595.00	11,713,758.00	13,319,891.00	14,227,037.00	13,948,349.00
Estates	1,143,596.00	3,593,400.00	2,193,744.00	4,736,791.00	2,585,289.00	6,002,341.00
Housing	15,604,496.00	11,120,347.00	15,363,686.00	11,063,167.00	16,949,626.00	11,871,133.00
Parking	1,950,222.00	2,045,077.00	2,310,461.00	2,343,082.00	2,662,351.00	2,632,195.00
Housing (LGA)						
Welfare	3,621,352.00	2,647,884.00	4,275,554.00	33,161,899.00	5,541,543.00	3,939,553.00
Water	26,180,164.00	24,040,005.00	29,068,516.00	27,641,850.00	33,379,741.00	31,586,103.00
Electricity	101,219,857.00	104,525,747.00				
Trad. Beer	54,361,628.00	58,017,077.00	58,401,496.00	63,195,255.00	67,416,767.00	70,891,396.00
Govt. Grant						
Totals	232,209,452.00	223,268,691.00	144,077,032.00	134,275,624.00	174,256,762.00	165,920,774.00

	1989-1990		1990-1991	
	Expenditure	Income	Expenditure	Income
Rates	106,685,128.00	112,050,436.00	100,391,005.00	100,913,020.00
Waste Management	6,291,785.00	7,419,615.00	8,262,674.00	9,065,136.00
Sewerage	16,299,398.00	15,162,948.00	16,084,116.00	17,216,030.00
Estates	21,613,619.00	5,879,131.00	3,441,233.00	7,812,660.00
Housing	17,432,703.00	13,667,456.00	3,400,165.00	2,143,497.00
Parking	2,960,875.00	3,178,085.00	494,065.00	908,744.00
Housing (LGA)				
Welfare	7,266,853.00	7,266,853.00	7,806,198.00	7,806,198.00
Water	40,474,694.00	42,772,887.00	44,723,711.00	50,658,245.00
Electricity				
Trad. Beer	75,054,630.00	80,509,235.00	88,760,368.00	92,219,899.00
Totals	200,657,502.00	207,952,177.00	185,181,685.00	197,065,896.00

Table 2

	1980 to 1981	1983 to 1984	1984 to 1985	1985 to 1986
Rates	\$527,474.00	\$870,170.00	\$828,091.00	\$810,294.00
Water Management				\$1,142,174.00
Sewerage	139,428.00	170,553.00	130,252.00	134,582.00
Estates				248,112.00
Housing	627,532.00	1,690,351.00	262,767.00	1,196,289.00
Parking				2,389,942.00
Housing (LGA)				1,613,335.00
Welfare	13,759.00	15,037.00	17,851.00	45,358.00
Water	529,844.00	668,358.00	710,437.00	899,120.00
Electricity				1,747,440.00
Trad. Beer	569,731.00	652,145.00	606,971.00	610,626.00
				807,039.00
				647,052.00
Totals	2,207,721.00	4,445,802.00	3,556,369.00	6,356,867.00
				4,332,439.00
	1987 to 1988	1988 to 1989	1989-1990	1991-1992
Rates	1,756,590.00	1,995,130.00	1,865,636.00	2,323,677.00
Water Management				2,096,226.00
Sewerage	460,727.00	498,309.00	269,113.00	306,816.00
Estates				1,434,159.00
Housing	1,945,374.00	4,389,892.00	4,278,848.00	4,238,921.00
Parking				3,435,663.00
Housing (LGA)				3,677,077.00
Welfare	29,326.00	9,456,194,591.00	37,763.00	41,386.00
Water	2,242,737.00	2,047,543.00	2,509,135.00	3,164,824.00
Electricity				17,294.00
Trade. Beer	653,823.00	584,308.00	757,175.00	2,607,849.00
				4,397,092.00
				1,068,798.00
				4,572,279.00
				759,623.00
Totals	7,008,577.00	6,586,628.00	9,477,295.00	11,475,948.00
				10,221,200.00
				14,052,385.00
				14,953,674.00

Source: Kadoma Annual Budget.

Table 3
District Council Finance: Gokwe

	Income	Expenditure
1988-1989	\$ 440,755.00	\$3,306,685.00
1989-90	6,353,827.00	5,908,880.00
1990-91	7,543,024.00	5,818,096.00
1991-92	3,690,357.00	4 059,088.00
1992-93	7,272,349.00	6,180,644.00

Source: Gokwe District Council Annual Budget.

Table 4
District Council Finance: Harava

	Income	Expenditure
1988/89	\$1,569,724.00	\$ 996,871.00
1989/90	1,744,433.00	1,411,127.00
1990/91	1,520,922.00	
1991/92	1,385,928.00	2,730,690.00
1992/93	2,955,414.00	

***Expenditure not Computed.**

Source: Harava District Council Budgets.

Table 6
Government Grants Relative to Total Revenue: Gokwe

Year	Amount	Total Revenue	Percentage
*1988-1989	\$2,363,960.00	\$7,736,110.00	31%
1989-1990	2,920,823.00	6,461,829.00	45%
*1990-1991	3,186,639.00	11,079,633.00	29%
*1991-1992	3,794,867.00	11,067,216.00	34%
1992-1993	3,154,050.00	7,140,704.00	44%

Source: Annual Budget for Gokwe

*The estimated locally generated revenue during these years were over-stated as compared to the actual expenditure. This decrease the significance of grants as a proportion of total revenue.

Table 7
Government Grants Relative To Total Revenue: Harare

Year	Amount	Total Revenue	Percentage
1988-1989	\$353,058.00	\$1,992,782.00	18%
1989-1990	402,896.00	2,147,319.00	19%
1990-1991	666,460.00	2,187,382.00	30%
1991-1992	491,411.00	1,877,339.00	26%
1992-1993	740,312.00	3,695,726.00	20%

* The figures for grants do not include assistance to health and education. The data for Harare was not very organised. But once these are added the average proportion surges up to around 44% of total revenue.

Table 8
Government Health Grants Relative to Actual Expenditure: Kadoma

Year	Grant	Expenditure	Percentage
1980/81	102623	102623	100%
1981/82	114051	114051	100%
1982/83	57000	143009	40%
1983/84	78000	157911	49%
1984/85	81000	167392	48%
1985/86	140000	178664	78%
1986/87	136000	178677	76%
1987/88	140000	189871	74%
1988/89	140000	209327	67%
1989/90	142000	202990	70%
1990/91	200000	302569	66%
1991/92	200000	503364	40%

Source: Kadoma Town Council Files.

Table 9
Cost Recovery in Municipal Health Centres: Kadoma

Year	Estimated Recurrent Expenditure	Actual Recurrent Expenditure	Total Revenue Collected
1989/90	\$337,631.00	\$327,392.00	\$103,523.00
1990/91	475,865.00	453,832.00	108,323.00
1991/92	635,300.00	503,364.00	146,790.00

Source: Kadoma Town Council Files.

Table 10 (a)
Income From Projects Relative to Local Revenue: Gokwe

Cheziya Gokwe District Income Generating Activities		
Year	Source	Amount
1988-1989	Guest House	\$ 56,420.00
	House Rentals	19,800.00
	Grinding Mills	63,360.00
	Beer Sales	1,276,700.00
Total		\$1,416,330.00
Total Local Revenue		\$4,407,550.00

Table 10 (b)

Year	Source	Amount
1989-1990	Beer Sales	\$1,495,405.00
	Guest House	61,667.00
	Grinding Mills	65,152.00
	Brick Moulding and Sales	180,000.00
Total		\$1,802,224.00
Total Local Revenue		\$6,738,343.00

Table 10(c)

Year	Source	Amount
1990-1991	Beer Sales	\$1,810,369.00
	Guest House	183,250.00
	Grinding Mills	86,527.00
	Brick Moulding and Sales	140,000.00
	Market Gardening	132,700.00
	Photographic Studio	84,326.00
	Poultry Project	36,029.00
Total		\$2,473,201.00
Total Local Revenue		\$7,543,024.00

Table 10(d)

Year	Source	Amount
1991-1992	Beer Sales	\$1,745,633.00
	Guest House	133,241.00
	Photographic Studio	77,340.00
	Grinding Mills	84,216.00
	Poultry Project	29,034.00
Total		\$2,096,464.00
Total Local Revenue		\$7,272,349.00

Table 10(e)

Year	Source	Amount
1992-1993	Beer Sales	\$1,739,185.00
	Guest House	113,697.00
	Grinding Mills	90,046.00
Total		\$1,924,928.00
Total Local Revenue		\$3,690,357.00

Table 10(f)
Summary of Income Generating Projects Relative to Total Local Revenue

	Revenue	Total Local Revenue	Percentage
1988-1981	\$1,416,330.00	\$4,407,550.00	32%
1989-1990	1,802,224.00	6,738,343.00	27%
1990-1991	2,473,201.00	7,543,024.00	33%
1991-1992	2,069,464.00	7,272,349.00	28%
1992-1993	1,942,928.00	3,690,357.00	53%

Source: Table 9: Gokwe Annual Budget.

Table 11(a)
Harava District Council

Income Generating Projects

Year	Source	Amount
1988-1989	Sand Sales	\$11 800
	Brick Sales	13 056
	Market Fees	14 900
	Beerhall rentals	3 600
	Kiosk rentals	2 400
	Transport hire	7 200
	Gunlope sales	1,150
Totals		54,106
Total Local Revenue		\$449 414

Table 11(b)

Year	Source	Amount
1989-1990	Beer Sales	\$721 660
	Beerhall rents	8 200
	Brick Sales	7 300
	Market fees	17 734
	Kiosk rentals	2 063
	Transport hire	7 806
	Grinding mill fees	77
	Garden produce fees	1 596
Totals		\$778 436
Total Local Revenue		\$1 744 423

Table 11(c)

Year	Source	Account
1990-1991	Beer Sales	\$710 000
	Beerhall rentals	9 000
	Sand sales	63 000
	Brick sales	54 000
	Cement sales	18 000
	Market fees	45 000
	Kiosk rental	4 800
	Transport hire	10 000
	Grinding mill fees	4 000
	Garden produce fees	2 000
Total		\$919 800
Total Local Revenue		\$1 520 000

Table 11(d)

Year	Source	Amount
1991-1992	Brick sales	\$26 900
	Grinding mill fees	3 940
	Beer sales	\$746 900
Totals		680 740
Total Local Revenue		\$1 700 000

Table 11(e)

Year	Source	Amount
1992-1993	Beer sales	\$1 153 456
	Brick sales & cement	303 200
	Grinding mill fees	5 400
	Garden produce sales	2 400
Totals		\$1 464 456
Total Local Revenue		\$2 955 414

Table 11(f)
Total Income from Projects Relative to Total Local Income

	Project Income	Total Income	Percentage
*1988-1989	54 106	1 569 724	4
1989-1990	778 436	1 744 423	47
1990-1991	919 800	1 520 922	60
1991-1992	780 740	1 385 928	56
1992-1993	1 464 456	2 955 414	50

***Beer Sales not included**

Source: Table 11 Harava Annual Budget.

Table 12
Housing Waiting List

Area	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Cheziya									6000
Gokwe									
Kadoma				274		2700	944	4121	1070
Harare	22781		33969	43171	50055	63024	73497		
Harava									

Source: Housing and Community Service Reports
 Harare City Council
 Kadoma Town Council
 Gokwe District Council

Table 13
Services Provided and Service Planned for
But Not Provided: Harare

1. <u>Works</u>	<u>Works</u>
(a) Road Maintenance	(a) Surgery Construction
(b) Buildings (Stand Services)	<u>Education</u>
(c) Water reticulation	(a) Secondary Education
(d) Sewege reticulation	(b) Tertiary Education
(e) Farming	<u>Housing</u>
(f) Anemities	(a) Middle income Residences
(g) Surreys	(b) Siya-so Industrial Stands
(h) Refuse Collection	<u>Community Services</u>
2. <u>Education</u>	(a) Market Stalls
(a) Pre-Schools	<u>Health</u>
(b) Primary Schools	(a) Specialised Treatment of Genito Urinal Diseases (STD's, AIDS & HIV)
(c) Secondary	
3. <u>Housing</u>	
(a) Bachelor Accomodation	
(b) Flats	
(c) Family Houses	
(d) Leasing	
4. <u>Community Services</u>	
(a) Clubs and Societies	
(b) Swimming Pools	
(c) Libraries	
(d) Co-operatives	
(e) Recreational Facilities	
5. <u>Health Services</u>	
(a) Environmental Health	
(b) Health Inspection Services	
(c) Health Education	
(d) General Health	
(e) Infectious Diseases Control	

Source: City of Harare Department of Works Reports.

Table 14
Services Provided And Service Planned
For But Not Provided

1. <u>Works</u>	<u>Works</u>
(a) Water & Sewege Reticulation	(a) Poultry Projects
(b) Road and Bridge Construction	(b) Piped Water Schemes in Rural Areas
(c) Service roads & street Lighting	
2. <u>Education</u>	<u>Education</u>
(a) Pre-Schools	(a) 'A' Level School
(b) Primary Education	(b) Tertiary/ Technical College
(c) Secondary Education	
3. <u>Housing</u>	<u>Housing</u>
Housing Accomodation Teachers/Nurses Accomodation	(a) Stand Servicing
	<u>Community Services</u>
4. <u>Community Services</u>	(a) Soccer Studio
(a) Liquor Outlets	(b) Community Halls
(b) Shops	(c) Recreation Centres
(c) Woodlets	
(d) Photo Studio	<u>Health</u>
(e) Grinding Mills	(a) Ambulance Services
5. <u>Health Services</u>	
(a) Clinical Services	
(b) Health Centres	
(c) Mobile Clinics	
(d) Health Education	
(e) General Family Health	
(f) Sanitary Facilities	

Source: Gokwe District Council Project Planning Department Reports.

Table 15.
Services Provided and Services Planned For
But Not Provided: Kadoma

1. <u>Works</u>	<u>Works</u>
(a) Water & Sewage reticulation	(a) Tarred Roads
(b) Road Construction and Maintenance	(esp. in high density Suburb (RIMUKA))
(c) Housing Construction and	
2. <u>Education</u>	<u>Education</u>
(a) Pre-School	1. Secondary Education
(b) Primary School (1)	2. Tertiary Education
3. <u>Housing</u>	<u>Health</u>
High & Low Density Leasing	(a) Mobile Clinic
4. <u>Community Services</u>	<u>Community Services</u>
(a) Beerhalls	(a) Social & Sports facilities in Low Density Suburbs
(b) Libraries	
(c) Clubs	
(d) Halls (Theatre)	
(e) Fields, Courts Pool, Theatres	
5. <u>Health Services</u>	
(a) Refuse Removal	
(b) Environmental Health	
(c) Primary Health	
(d) Health Education	
(e) General Family Health	

Source: Kadoma Town Council Department of Works Reports.

Table 16
Services Provided and Services Planned For
But Not Provided: Harava

1. <u>Works</u>	<u>Works</u>
(a) Water & Sewage reticulation	(a) Solar Electrification
(b) Road Construction and Maintainance	<u>Education</u>
2. <u>Education</u>	1. Pre-school Facilities
(a) Primary	2. School-leavers
(b) Secondary	Technical College
3. <u>Housing</u>	<u>Housing</u>
Construction	(a) Teachers Association
Leasing	(b) Stand Servicing
	(c) Provision of Title Deeds
4. <u>Community Services</u>	<u>Community Services</u>
(a) Beerhall & Bar Facilities	(a) Library Construction
	(b) Recreational Facilities Hall
5. <u>Health Services</u>	
(a) General Family Health	<u>Health</u>
(b) Environmental Health	
(c) Health Education	(a) Operating Surgery

Source: Harava District Council Project Planning Department Report.

Table 17
Harare

Type of Service	Corresponding Source of Supporting Resources
Education	Ministry of Education and Culture Community Groups
Housing	Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing World Bank Non-Governmental Organisation Housing Co-operatives Ministry of National Affairs, Employment Creation and Co-operatives
Community Services	Private Clubs and Societies Private Individuals
Health Services	Private Hospitals and Clinics Ministry of Health Non-Governmental Organisations Private Doctors
Works	Ministry of Energy, Water Resources & Development ZESA.

Source: Harare City Council Files.

Table 18**Kadoma**

Type of Service	Correspondence Source of Supporting Resources
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Education	Ministry of Education and Culture. Community Groups Jairos Jiri Association
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Housing	Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing Art Corporation Rio Tinto (Pvt) Ltd
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Community Services	Private Clubs and Societies Private Businessman & Individuals Rio Tinto (Pvt) Ltd
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Health	Ministry of Health Private Companies Private Doctors
--------	--

Works	Ministry of Energy, Water Resources & Development Community Groups
-------	--

Source: Kadoma Town Council Files.

Table 19
Gokwe

Type of Services	Corresponding Source of Supporting Resources
Education	Ministry of Education and Culture Seventh Day Adventist Community Groups Catholic Church Swedish International Development Agency European Economic Community
Housing	Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing Pilot District Support Programme (UK)
Community Services	Private Individuals & Organisations
Health	Ministry of Health Pilot District Support Programme (UK) Mission Hospitals (Catholic Church)
Works	Ministry of Energy, Water Resources & Development ZESA

Source: Gokwe District Council Files.

Table 20
Harare

*Type of Service	Corresponding Source of Supporting Resources
Education	Ministry of Education and Culture Community Groups
Housing	Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing World Bank Non-Governmental Organisation Housing Co-operatives Ministry of National Affairs, Employment Creation and Co-operatives
Community Services	Private Clubs and Societies Private Individuals
Health Services	Private Hospitals and Clinics Ministry of Health Non-Governmental Organisations Private Doctors
Works	Ministry of Energy, Water Resources & Development ZESA

*Other than those provided by Council

Source: Harare City Council Files

Table 21
Equipment: Kadoma

Moveable Property Owned	Quantity
Water Bowser	1
Tractors	6
7 Tonne Trucks	3
3 Tonne Trucks	2
Pick Ups	6
Tipper	1
Mayoral Car	1
Small Vehicles	3
Ambulances	2
Fire Tenders	2
Rapid Intervention Vehicles	2

Source: Kadoma Town Council's Administration Department

Table 22
Equipment: Gokwe

Moveable Property Owned	Quantity
Leyland Commet	1
Landrover	5
Mazda B1800	1
Tractor	1
Datsun Patrol	1
Universal Grader	1
Trailers	3
Isuzu DX19	1
Ploughs	2
Water Engine	9
Oxmco Welding Machine	1
Welding Helmet	1
Combination Spanner	13
Ring Spanner	2
Socket Spanner	5

Source: Gokwe District Council Files

Table 23
Equipment: Harava

Moveable Property Owned	Quantity
Tractor	1
Truck(s)	3
Ambulance	1
Grader	1
Grinding Mill	1
Brick Moulding Machine	1

Source: Harava District Council Files

PROJECTS DONE
COST AND IMPLEMENTING AGENCY

4.3.2. PROJECTS FOR LOCAL FUNDING

PRIORITY	PROJECT NAME DESCRIPTION	WARD	EST. COST	SOURCE OF FUNDING
1.1	<u>Borehole Cleanouts</u>			
1.1.1	Charama Hills	Sai	15 000	Donor
1.1.2	Mutangadura	Sai II	"	"
1.1.3	Jiri School	Jiri	"	"
1.1.4	Gwetsanga Sch	Jiri	"	"
1.1.5	Magondo Village	Chisina III	"	"
1.2	<u>New Boreholes</u>			
1.2.1	Ngani Sch B/H	Nemangwe III	20 000	Donor
1.2.2	Chikunakuna B/H	Chisina III	"	"
1.2.3	Chidoma B/H	Madzivazvido	"	"
1.2.4	Chitsa B/C	Gumunyu I	"	"
1.2.5	Manyangavana	"	"	"
1.2.6	Maleke Video	Nenyunga	"	"
1.2.7	Mangena Sch	Sai I	"	"
1.2.8	Makamure Sch	Makore III	"	"
1.2.9	Nevana	Chireya III	"	"
1.2.10	Jordan Tank 2	Masuka	"	"
1.2.11	Chita Chezvipo	St Agnes Mis	"	C.Z.M/Donor
1.5	<u>Wells</u>			
<u>1.5.1</u>	<u>Machakata</u>	<u>Njelele I</u>	<u>6 000</u>	<u>LA/Donor</u>
<u>1.5.2</u>	<u>Zvibhorani</u>	<u>Huchu</u>	<u>"</u>	<u>"</u>
	<u>Simbarinopa</u>			
<u>1.5.3</u>	<u>Zimbodza School</u>	<u>Masuka</u>	<u>"</u>	<u>"</u>
<u>1.5.4</u>	<u>Rugora School</u>	<u>Nemangwe</u>	<u>"</u>	<u>"</u>
<u>1.5.5</u>	<u>Sibojiwe Simbe</u>	<u>Chireya III</u>	<u>"</u>	<u>"</u>
<u>2.0</u>	<u>Rural Road Network</u>			
2.1	Mutehwe/Katamba Rd 121	Nembudziya II	500 000	Donor
3.0	<u>Health Services</u>			
3.1	Zimbabwe Spiritual Healing & Centre	Gumunyu I	65 000	Donor
3.1	Nyadohwe Clinic	Gumunyu I	220 000	L.A
3.2	Huchu Clinic	Huchu	75 000	Self Help Donor

4.2	<u>Primary Schools</u>			
4.2.1	Savarada School	Chireya II	45 000	L.A
4.2.2	Mutsamvi	Mkoka/Msala	"	"
4.2.3	Rugare	Gumunyu II	"	"
4.2.4	Kufakairi Sch	Chireya I	"	"
4.2.5	Vocational Training Feasibility Studies	Nembudziya I Gokwe G.P Muyambi	45 000 " "	Donor " "
4.5	<u>Pre-Schools</u>	All Wards	100 000	Self Help 5%
4.6	Adult Literacy	All Wards with emphasis in Nenyungu and Simchembu		Self-Help
5.0	<u>Agricultural Development</u>			
5.3	<u>Grazing Schemes</u>			
5.3.1	Chevecheve	Chisina I	100 000	Donor
5.3.2	Huchu	Huchu	100 000	"
5.3.3	Game Corridor	Madzivasvido Chireya I & Nenyunga	5 000 000	L.A L . A & Donor
6.0	Land Use Planning and Geological Surveys Accelerated. Land Use			
7	<u>Demarcation</u>	All Wards		Donor & Self Help
8	Basic Infrastructure at Gokwe Growth Point			Italian A i d P.S.I.P
9	Natural Conservation Stragegy			
9.3.1	Eight Woodlots	Ngomeni I	8 000	Forestry Commision
10.	Employment Opport			
10.1	Kamhororo Consolidated			

10.2	Gardens	Nemangwe IV		Donor
10.3	Uniform Making	Nemangwe I	15 000	"
	Shingai Poultry			
	& Market Gardening			
	Project	Njelelo I	11 000	"
10.4	Vocational Training	Nembudzia I	50 000	"
	Centre			
11.	Data Gathering Data			
	Collection	All Wards		Donor L.A
	TOTAL	48	6 929 000	

GOKWE

4.3.0 Year I: Projects for 1991/92

4.3.1 PROJECTS PER PSIP FUNDING IMPLEMENTING AGENT

1.1	Borehole cleanouts	WARD	COST	DDF/MEWRD
1.1.1	Mucharonga	Jiri	\$15 000	"
1.1.2	Mudondo	Goredema	"	"
1.1.3	Tazivana	"	"	"
1.1.4	Svova	Nembudzia I	"	"
1.1.5	Mkulunga	Jahana	"	"
1.1.6	Matengwa	Sai II	"	"
1.2	<u>New Boreholes</u>			
1.2.1	Gwarusonde	Nemangwe I	\$20 000	DDF/MEWRD
1.2.2	Zvikwete	Nemangwe IIIq	"	"
1.2.3	Mutirimukwa	Chireya III	"	"
1.2.4	Kajimivanda	Chireya I	"	"
1.2.5	Charama	Nemangwe I	"	"
1.2.6	Chota	Nembudzia III	"	"
1.2.7	Zanda School	Chireya III	"	"
1.2.8	Zimwara	Sai I	"	"
1.2.9	Matsikinya	Ndhlalambi I	"	"
1.2.10	Kamwa	Nembudzia II	"	"
1.3	<u>Piped Water Schemes</u>			
1.3.1	<u>Kamhororo P/scheme</u>	<u>Neangwe IV</u>	<u>\$100 000</u>	<u>"</u>
1.3.2	<u>Masuka Rehab</u>	<u>Masuka</u>	<u>\$250 000</u>	<u>"</u>
2.0	<u>Roads and Bridges</u>			
2.1	Choto-Mbungu T/off			
	Road 107	Jiri	\$789 600	DDF
2.2	Gokwe-Nyarupakwe			
	Road 108	Njelele/Chisina	\$489 600	"
2.3	Lukukwe-Sai Rd 104		50 400	"
3.0	<u>Health Services</u>			
3.1	Dambamazuna RHC	Chireya IIIII	275 000	MOH
4.1	<u>Education</u>			
	Lower sixth form	Gokwe G.P.	500 000	MPCNH
4.4.1	Madzivazvido Sec	Madzivazvido	150 000	He & LA

5.	<u>Agricultural Development</u>			
5.1	A.H.H.C			
5.1.1	Manyeni	Sai I	35 000	V e t Services
5.1.2	Blue-Gum	Chisina I	"	"
5.1.3	Masakadza	Nemangwe II	"	"
5.1.4	Denda	Chireya II	"	"
5.1.5	Kana Mission	Chirima	"	"
5.1.6	Sengwa Bridge	Sai II	"	"
5.6	Chemahororo Irr Scheme	Njelele II	72 000	Agritex
6.	<u>Land Use Planning and Geological Surveys</u>			
6.1	Kajuirivanda Rural Housing	Chireya I		
6.2	Land Use Implementation	Ngomeni	300 000	Agritex LA
7.	<u>Rural Electrification</u>			
7.1	Manoti R.S.C	Muyambi		ZESA
7.2	Njelele R.S.C	Njelele I		"
7.3	Gokwe G.P	Gokwe Central		"
8.	<u>Basic Infrasturcture Gokwe G.P</u>			
8.1	Low Cost Houses	Gokwe G.P	\$575 000	L.A
8.2	Sports Stadium	"	\$250 000	L.A
8.3	Community Hall	"	\$275 000	L.A
9.	<u>Natural Conservation Strategy</u>			
9.1	Mapfumo sponge Prot	Njelele III	\$ 8 807	Nat Res
9.2	Mangilazi Gully ext	Chisina II	1 214	"
9.3	Chemhangwa Sponge	Ndlalambi I	2 500	"
9.4	Majaji Cons Garden	Nemangwe I	4 056	"
9.5	Mvumba Gully	Simchembu	2 206	"
9.6	Magoboyi sponge and G Garden	Ndlalambi I	2 400	@

Source Gokwe District Council Rolling Plan

Projects Embarked Upon By Harava District Council in 1992/93 Fiscal Year

Project	Cost	Source of Funding	Implementing Agent
Zhakata Ward Grazing Scheme	Z\$80.000	Harava District Council	Harava D.C.
Fencing Gombe Gully	Z\$ 6.000	Natural Resource Board	Harava D.C/ N.R.B.
Chivasa Village Reclamation	Z\$691.000	Natural Resources Board	Harava D.C/ N.R.B.

Project	Cost	Source of Funding	Implementing Agent
Construction of Guzha Market	Z\$180.000	Harava District Council	Harava D.C.
Construction of Cattle Sale Pen at Dema	Z\$ 20.000	Natural Resources	Vet Department /Harava D.C.
Ngome Ward Agricultural Garden	Z\$ 12.000	Health Ministry	Harava D.C.
Batsiranai Wire Making Co-op Karengwa & Taguta Gardening Co-ops	Z\$ 25.000	Zimbabwe Women's Bureau & NGO's & Co-ops	Zimbabwe Women's Bureau & NGO's & Dept of Co-ops
Ngezi Butchery Poultry Pfungwa Hupfumi Poultry & Sewing	Z\$ 27.000	ZWB, NGO's	ZWB, NGO's
Mutiusinazita Ngome	Z\$ 20.000	ZWB, NGO's	NGO's, Agritex & Harava D.C.
Mutiusinazita, Mutowodzwa, Kurima Kwakanaka & Chenhondoro Gardening Co-ops. Ngome	Z\$ 58.000	ZWB, NGO's	ZWB & NGO

Water Development

Project	Cost	Source of Funding	Implementing Agent
Five (5) Boreholds at Mapfuti, Zhakata & Chirima-mhunga Wards	Z\$60.000	District Dev.	District Dev. Fund

Roads

Project	Cost	Source of Funding	Implementing Agent
Chinyanga-Boni, Dema Zinhanga, Chiota Ardilusa Chitungwiza- Ushewekunze (47,6km)	Z\$279.000	District Devt. Fund	District Devt. Fund
Road Maintainance 104km	Z\$ 63.000	District Devt. Fund	District Devt. Fund

Externally Funded Projects

Project	Cost	Source of Funding	Implementing Agent
Beatrice Sewerage and Water Reticulation	Z\$180.000	Migrud	Migrud & PSIP

Locally Funded Projects

Project	Cost	Source of Funding	Implementing Agents
Electrification of Township, Beatrice Primary & Secondary Schools	Z\$22.000	Harava District Council	Z.E.S.A

Education (Externally Funded)* (Non were Locally Funded)

Project	Cost	Source of Funding	Implementing Agent
Nyabira Pre-school	Z\$30.000	P.S.I.P. Education	Harava District Council

Projects Envisaged in 1993-94 Financial Year by Harava District Council

Agriculture

Project	Cost	Source of Funding	Implementing Agent
Fencing of Muzorovi	Z\$30.000	District Devt. Fund	District Devt. Fund
Beerhall Renovations & Electrification	Z\$70.000	District Devt. Fund	District Devt. Fund

Income Generating Projects

Project	Cost	Source of Funding	Implementing Agent
Beehive Erection	Z\$30.000	District Devt. Fund	District Devt. Fund
Beerhall Renovations & Eletrification of Dema Kiosks	Z\$70.000	District Devt. Fund	District Devt. Fund

Source: Harava District Council Plans



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